June 2011


bismillah

BismillahirRahmanirRahim

Çoğunluğun her istediğinin ve tercihinin doğru ve isabetli olması için o çoğunluğun hak ve doğru bir eğitim görmesi gerekir.

Hak ve doğru bir eğitim görmeyen bir halkın isteklerinin, tercihlerinin bir kısmının doğru, bir kısmının yanlış olması çok tabiîdir.

Müslüman bir halk iyi, sağlam, köklü, sahih bir islamî eğitim görmüşse, doğruları ister, seçer, tercih eder.

Müslüman yanılmaz diye kural yoktur. Müslümanlar da yanılabilir.

Bu yanılma birkaç tür olur.

İslam dairesi içinde yanılabilirler.

İtikatlarında bid’at ve bozukluk olabilir.

Müslüman ama mezhebsiz… Büyük yanılgı.

Müslüman ama telfik-i mezâhib taraftarı… Bu da büyük bir yanılgı ve sapmadır.

Müslüman ama kaderi inkâr ediyor… Korkunç bir yanılgı…

Müslüman ama şefaati, kabir ahvalini, Münkereyn’i (iki soru meleğini) inkâr ediyor… Yanılgı üzerine yanılgı.

Beş vakit namaz kılan bir Müslüman, İslam’ı, Kur’anı, Resulullahı inkar eden kafirler de Cennetliktir diyor. Ne büyük yanılgı.

Üç hak ibrahimî din vardır. Üçünün bağlıları da ehl-i necat ve ehl-i Cennettir diye itikat ediyor. Bu da büyük yanılgı, ayak kayması.

Hem Müslüman, hem de Sünneti inkar ediyor. Yanılmış, sapmış Müslüman.

İslam dışı yanılgılar:

Hem Müslüman, hem Kemalist… Olur mu böyle şey?

Dini İslammış ama medeniyeti Batı medeniyetiymiş… Ne büyük çelişki!..

Evet, Müslümanları yanılgılardan, bid’atlerden, sapıklıklardan, saçmalıklardan, yanlış tercihlerden korumak için onlara çok köklü, çok sağlam, çok güçlü bir din eğitimi vermek gerekir.

Bu eğitimi ancak icazetli ulema, fukaha, kâmil mürşidler verebilir.

Tâğutî düzenin din mekteplerinde ne kadar gayret gösterilirse gösterilsin böyle bir eğitim verilemez. Büyük fire verilir.

Gerçek İslam okulunda bütün öğrenciler beş vakit namazı cemaat ile kılar.

Gerçek İslam mektebinde sahih itikat öğretilir.

Gerçek İslam mektebinde kız erkek karışık eğitim olmaz.

Sultan Abdülhamid Han hazretleri zamanında Galatasaray Sultanisinde (lisesinde) bütün Müslüman öğrenciler, okul camiinde, okulun resmî imamı ardında cemaatle namaz kılıyordu.

Bugün laik rejimin hangi din okulunda bu salâbet vardır?

Şu ilahiyatçıya bakın: Azılı farmason, azılı taqiyyeci, karışık ve bulaşık Afganî büyük bir İslam önderiymiş. Müslümanlar onun peşine düşerek kurtulurmuş… Vah vah ne günlere kaldık! Farmasonu imam kabul eden Müslüman yanılmasın da ne yapsın?

Para kazanmak, zengin olmak, köşeyi dönmek, voliyi vurmak, yüklü te’lif ücreti almak için tefsir, hadîs, din kitabı yazan, Kur’an meâli veya tercümesi yapan adamlardan bu Ümmete, bu gençliğe ne hayır gelir.

Şu haram-hor İslamcı bozuntusuna bakınız: Hem namaz kılıyor, hem de malı götürüyor.

Namazı dosdoğru ve hakkıyla kılan kişi hiç haram yer mi?

O adam doğru dürüst namaz kılsaydı o namaz onu azgınlıklardan korurdu.

Evet kişi lâfla Müslüman olmaz. Sadece oruç tutmakla (veya tutar görünmekle), namaz kılmakla (veya kılar görünmekle) Müslümanlık bitmez.

Müslüman odur ki:

İtikadı sahih ola.

Ahlâkı sağlam ola.

Karakteri düzgün ola.

Haram yemeye.

Paraya tapmaya.

Birtakım ruhbanları ve baronları erbab edinmeye (tanrılaştırmaya, putlaştırmaya).

Âdil ola.

Yalan söylemeye.

Gıybet etmeye.

Mürüvvetli ola.

Fütüvvet ahlakına sahip ola.

Mâruf ile emr ede ve münkerden nehy ede.

Peygamberin (Salat ve selam olsun ona) vekili, vârisi, halifesi durumunda olan kâmil bir zata bağlı olup onun öğütlerini dinleye.

Nefs-i emmâresini en büyük düşmanı bile.

Mezhebi, meşrebi değişik de olsa bütün mü’minleri kardeş bile ve kardeşlik hukukuna riayet ede.

Zamanın İmam-ı Gaibine biatli ola.

Allah ile ezelde yapmış olduğu ahd ü misaka sâdık ola.

Peygamber’e (Salat ve selam olsun ona) biatli ola, ona itaat ede.

Dünya ihtiyaçlarını çoğaltmaya.

İsraf etmeye, lüks ve sefahat yollarına sapmaya.

Kötülüğü iyilik ile def’ ede.

Âhirete yönelik ola.

Gerçek ve olgun Müslüman odur ki, insaflı düşmanları bile onun faziletini kabul, tasdik ve teslim eder.

Vasıflı, olgun Müslüman az yanılır.

Vasıfsız ve islamî eğitim görmemiş Müslüman çok yanılır.

İnsî şeytanlar iyi eğitim görmemiş, ilmihalini iyi bilmeyen Müslümanlara musallat olur ve onu tuzaklarına düşürür.

Bunca ilim okumuş ve İslam’da kader yoktur diye diretiyor. Böylesi câhil değil, capcâhildir.

Ehl-i Sünnetin hadis imamlarını, allâmelerini, büyük muhaddisleri bırakmış, icâzetsiz bid’atçi Albanî’yi imam edinmiş. Bu adam aleyhinde icazetli ulemanın ve muhaddislerin yazdığı, bazısı birkaç cilt onca reddiye kitabını görmemiş, duymamış mı?

Kur’ana hakkıyla uyan.

Sünnete hakkıyla uyan.

Rabbanî ve ‘âmil ulema ve fukahaya tâbi olan.

Kâmil bir mürşide el veren…

Kurtulur, yanılsa bile esasta yanılmaz, teferruatta birkaç küçük yanlışı olabilir.

Böyle bir Müslüman doğruları tercih eder.

Böyle bir Müslüman insî ve cinnî şeytanların tuzaklarına düşmez.

Böyle bir Müslüman Deccalların, Kezzabların, Tâğutların, Süfyanîlerin tuzaklarına düşmez.

Böyle bir Müslüman haram yemez.

Böyle bir Müslüman mağrur ve mütekebbir olmaz.

Böyle bir Müslüman dâll ve mudil olmaz, hidayete çağırır ve doğru yolda kılavuzluk eder.

Ah sağlam ve doğru islamî eğitim!..

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bismillah

BismillahirRahmanirRahim

By Jonathan Head

BBC News, Istanbul

Turkish guards on border with Syria near the town of Yayladagi - 11 June
Turkey fears conflict with Syria because of their 900km common border

Two years ago, Israeli commentators noted what they saw as an alarming development. Turkey and Syria announced that they had just held their first joint military exercise.

It seemed to presage an extraordinary strategic shift by Turkey, whose million-strong army has been part of the Nato alliance since 1951, and which bought much of its equipment from Israel.

Coming in the same year that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan launched an emotional verbal assault on Israel over its operations in Gaza, and when a scheduled joint exercise with the Israeli air force in Turkey had been abruptly cancelled, Israelis feared they were witnessing the creation of a new hostile alliance to the north.

In the end, although the Syrians made much of the “exercise”, Turkish officials explained that it had amounted to little more than a small number of troops on either side of the border, trying to communicate with each other through radios, with mixed success.

What Mr Erdogan’s government did do was apply the same formula for improving its relations with Syria that it has with most other neighbouring countries. This involved high-level, reciprocal visits by the leaders of both countries, accompanied by large delegations of ministers and entrepreneurs, the abolition of visa requirements and a flurry of trade agreements.

It fitted the governing AK Party’s foreign policy vision, one that emphasised normalising once-frosty relations with its neighbours, and relying first on business and investment deals to drive the process.

With Syria, this brought impressive results. Trade over the past decade has risen from around $730mn to $2,270mn last year. Turkish exporters have done particularly well – exports to Syria have risen nearly tenfold. Cities close to the border like Gaziantep and Aleppo have enjoyed racing economic growth, thanks to this trade and an influx of Syrian and Turkish visitors taking advantage of visa-free travel.

Exploring alternatives

The new relationship also brought officials closer together, and gave Turkey unusual access to the secretive Syrian ruling elite. Mr Erdogan developed a warm personal rapport with Bashar al-Assad, and there were regular meetings between the intelligence chiefs of the two countries.

Even Mr Erdogan’s critics acknowledge that the government has little influence over events in Syria, and no good policy options

So when anti-government protests started in Syria, Turkey was caught off-guard. Mr Erdogan had been quick to urge President Mubarak in Egypt to listen to the voice of the people, and step down. In Libya, constrained at first by Turkey’s big investments and the presence of 25,000 Turkish nationals, Mr Erdogan kept up a dialogue with the Gaddafi regime for a while, but then joined the international coalition pressing him to leave.

But Syria was different. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu told me at the end of March that Turkey feared the chaos that might well follow the fall of President Assad. This is not like Egypt or Libya, he said. It is has the potential to become an intractable sectarian conflict, more like Iraq. And Turkey shares a 900km border with Syria.

Those fears are shared by Turkey’s Western partners, and there has been little criticism of Mr Erdogan’s insistence that he should keep talking to President Assad, and urging him to embrace reform. No other leader has had so many, often lengthy, phone conversations with the Syrian president, and with no obvious alternatives to Mr Assad, there seemed little to lose by it.

But Turkey is also quietly exploring those alternatives. It allowed a meeting of hundreds of Syrian dissidents in the resort city of Antalya, with the aim of turning the disparate opposition forces into a more coherent movement.

Kurdish problem

Kurdish pro-democracy demonstration in Qamishli, northern Syria, 27 may
Trouble in Syria’s Kurdish regions could spill over into Turkey

Now the Turkish rhetoric towards President Assad has hardened, after more than 4,000 Syrian residents have come over the border into Hatay province, fleeing attacks by the security forces. There is widespread public sympathy here for the victims of the Syrian crackdown, accentuated by graphic images being circulated by activists.

Mr Erdogan is especially sensitive to public sentiments in what is an election week. He has condemned what he called “atrocities” by the Syrian authorities, and described the abuses as “unacceptable”. He has hinted that he might endorse action by the UN Security Council, although Mr Davutoglu still argues that the time is not right to consider international intervention.

Turkey says it will allow anyone fleeing violence in Syria to cross its border, but it refuses to call them refugees, and the Turkish army is stopping journalists from meeting or interviewing the fugitives. The Turkish authorities say they are preparing for a much bigger influx.

Even Mr Erdogan’s critics acknowledge that the government has little influence over events in Syria, and no good policy options.

Of particular concern is the possibility of unrest in the Kurdish areas of Syria spilling over, and igniting trouble among Turkey’s restive Kurdish minority. President Assad has offered Syrian Kurds autonomy, and he invited Kurdish leaders for a meeting in Damascus right after the opposition meeting in Antalya, a pointed reminder to the Turkish government of the trouble Syria could cause if relations between the two countries break down.

Thirteen years ago they came close to war over the Syrian backing then for the Kurdish insurgent movement, the PKK. It was the withdrawal of that backing that allowed the Turkish armed forces to isolate the PKK, and capture its leader Abdullah Ocalan. Tension in the Kurdish region of Turkey is higher than it has been for many years, with the Turkish government sticking to its hard-line rejection of any dialogue with the PKK.

Losing Syrian co-operation over the Kurds is a significant price Turkey may have to pay for the fast-changing political environment in the Middle East, along with the potential loss of its recently-won commercial gains.

bismillah

BismillahirRahmanirRahim

İLAHÎ İslam dini ile Marksist ideoloji uyuşur ve bağdaşır mı?.. Uyuşur ve bağdaşır demek mümkün değildir. İkisi birbirinin zıddıdır.

İslam, Tevhid inancı yani kemal sıfatlarla sıfatlı, noksan sıfatlardan münezzeh, kainatın Yaratıcısı, alemlerin Rabbi, mutlak kudret Sahibi, ilmi ve iradesi her şeyi kuşatmış bir Allah’ın varlığını kabul eder. Marksizm ise ateisttir, materyalisttir.

Peki İslam dini ile, M. Kemal Paşa’nın ölümünden sonra çıkartılmış Kemalist ideoloji uyuşur ve bağdaşır mı?

Bu ikisi de bağdaşmaz ve uyuşmaz.

İnsan sadece Allah’a inanmakla Müslüman olamaz. Kelime-i Tevhid’in, birbirinden ayrılmaz iki esası vardır: Allah’tan başka ilah olmadığına ve Hz. Muhammed’in (Salat ve selam olsun ona) Allah’ın Resulü olduğuna iman etmek.

Kemalist sistemde (Ona bir tür dindir de diyebiliriz…) Allah’a iman şartı yoktur. Bir deist de Kemalist olabilir, bir ateist de.

Kemalizm’in esası/temeli M. Kemal’e iman etmektir. İşte bu yönden İslam ile Kemalizm uyuşmaz ve bağdaşmaz.

Son 60 yıl içinde yetişen birtakım sözde İslam ilahiyatçıları, İslam ile Kemalizmi uyuşturmaya, bağdaştırmaya çalışıyorlar. Boşuna gayret!

İslam dininin temel kitabı ve kaynağı Kur’andır. Kemalistler Kitabullah’ı temel kaynak ve referans olarak kabul etmez.

İslam’da âhirete iman şartı vardır. Kemalizmde âhirete inanıp inanmamak ihtiyaridir, yani seçimliktir, ister inanır, ister inanmaz.

İslam’da din ve dünya ayırımı yoktur. Kemalizmin ana umdesi ise, laikliktir. Nice Kemaliste göre din bir vicdan işidir, dünyaya karışamaz.

İslam, insan sağlığına zarar veren ve nice sosyal hastalığa yol açan içkiyi yasak etmiştir. Kemalizmde ise içki bol bol içilir.

İslam ribayı/faizi yasak kılmıştır. Kemalizmde ise iktisat, ticaret, finansla ilgili muamelatta faiz esastır.

İslam kadın konusunda hayâyı, iffeti, tesettürü esas almıştır. Kemalizm ise tesettüre ve İslam’ın kadın anlayışına karşıdır.

İslam’da din esaslarına dayanan Tevhidî eğitim sistemi vardır. Kemalizmin Tevhid-i Tedrisat eğitim sistemi ise nice husus ve noktalarda İslam’a taban tabana zıttır.

İslam’ın bir Şeriatı vardır. Kemalizm bu Şeriata radikal şekilde karşıdır.

İslam’da yaratılış inancı vardır, kemalizmde evrim teorisi.

İslam’da İmamet/Hilafet vardır. Kemalizm Hilafete karşıdır ve onu yıkmıştır.

Masonların geleneksel kolu, “Kainatın Yüce Mimarına” inanmayanları Masonluğa almaz, “localara” sokmaz. Kemalizmde böyle bir şart yoktur.

Yahudiler ve Hıristiyanlar da Allah’a, âhirete inanırlar ama Allah’a, Peygamberlere, ilahi Kitaplara iman bakımından İslam ile aralarında ittifak ve uyum yoktur.

Bir insanın Müslüman olması için Allah’ı kemal sıfatlarla sıfatlandırması, noksan sıfatlardan tenzih etmesi gerekir.

Müslüman, isimleri bilinsin veya bilinmesin BÜTÜN Peygamberlere iman eder.

Müslüman BÜTÜN kitaplara iman eder. (Daha önce gönderilen kitaplar tahrife uğramıştır.)

Yukarıdaki izahattan anlaşılacağı üzere:

İslam ile ateist ve materyalist bir ideoloji olan Marksizm uyuşmaz ve bağdaşmaz.

İslam ile Kemalizm uyuşmaz ve bağdaşmaz.

İslam ile Yahudilik ve Hıristiyanlık uyuşmaz ve bağdaşmaz.

İslam tek hak din olmakta, tek hak dünya nizamı olmakta hiçbir başka din ve ideoloji ile müşareket (ortaklık) kabul etmez.

Teolojik bakımdan dünya üzerinde, İslam’ın zuhurundan sonra tek ibrahimî din vardır, o da İslam’dır.

İslam dini Nazizm ile de bağdaşmaz ve uyuşmaz ama Naziler İslam’a ve Müslümanlara karşı oldukça saygılı davranmışlardır.

Türkiye’nin yakın tarihinde Kemalizmin İslam’a ve Müslümanlara yaptıkları, sahih bilgiler ve gerçek belgelerle gözler önündedir.

İslam ile Kemalizmin bağdaşabileceği iddiası doğru, realist, insaflı bir iddia değildir.

Tevhid inancı ile Teslis inancı nasıl asla bağdaşmaz ve uyuşmaz ise İslam ile Kemalizm de uyuşmaz ve bağdaşmaz.

İslam ile Kemalizmin uyuşup bağdaşacağı tezini ortaya sürenler M. Kemal Paşa’nın bidayette sarf ettiği bazı sözlere dayanıyorlar. Paşa’yı bir bütün olarak ele almak gerekir. Bütüne bakınca, bizim uyuşmazlık tezimizin ve iddiamızın doğru olduğu anlaşılacaktır.

ABD, AB, beynelmilel Siyonizm, militan Haçlılar ve Evangelistler, Vatican, global emperyalistler Türkiye’de kendilerine hizmet edecek evcil, ılımlı, suya sabuna dokunmaz, fıkıhsız ve Şeriatsız, ilahî hak din olmaktan çıkıp bir hümanizme haline dönüşmüş seküler/beşerî bir İslam türetmek istiyorlar.

Hatta kulağımıza geldiğine göre 1924’te ilga edilmiş Hilafeti, bu makama kendilerine tâbi uydu bir kişiyi getirmek şartıyla yeniden hayata geçirmek istiyorlarmış.

bismillah

BismillahirRahmanirRahim

Turkey’s June 12 Elections and Eurocentrism

9JUN

The following post is written in collaboration with Hilal Elver, my Turkish wife. It is posted a few days before Turkish elections this Sunday that will have a great impact on Turkey‘s political future. As a sign of changes in the world, the pre-election attention given to these elections in Turkey is a notable example. Turkey has emerged as ‘a success story’ in a global setting where most of the news is interpreting various forms of failure, especially in meeting global challenges such as food security, climate change, and economic instability and recession.

*************

            The Economist leader headline in its June 4th issue is revealing: “The best way for Turks to promote democracy would be to vote against the ruling party.” It reveals a mentality that has not shaken itself free from the paternalism and entitlements of the bygone colonialist days. What makes such an assertion so striking is that The Economist would know better than to advise American or Canadian or Israeli citizens how to vote. And it never did venture such an opinion on the eve of the election of such reactionary and militarist figures as George W. Bush, Stephen Harper, or Benjamin Netanyahu. Are the people of Turkey really so politically backward as to require guidance from this bastion of Western elite opinion so as to learn what is in their own best interest?

 

            Surely it is a strange recommendation even putting aside its interventionary aspects. As The Economist itself admits the progress Turkey has made internally and internationally since the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. Its economy has flourished, civilian control of the governing process has been greatly strengthened, creative efforts have been undertaken to solve outstanding conflicts involving the Kurdish minority and Cyprus, and Turkey has fashioned a creative and constructive foreign policy that has greatly enhanced its regional and global reputation. With such an unquestioned record of achievement, it seems strange to go so far beyond calling attention to some serious lingering problems in Turkey by instructing the people of Turkey to vote for an opposition party that attacks the AKP relentlessly but offers no alternative vision for how it might improve upon its policies.

 

As Stewart Patrick put it recently in the pages of Foreign Affairs, the influential American journal on global policy: “The dramatic growth of Brazil, China, and India—and the emergence of middle-tier economies such as Indonesia and Turkey—is transforming the geopolitical landscape and testing the institutional foundation of the post-World War II liberal order.” Notable here is the recent acceptance of Turkey as a major regional and global actor, something that was not present in the political imagination before this period of AKP leadership.

 

And if we look beyond Eurocentric perspectives, the rise of Turkey is even more dramatic. In the Middle East, it is Turkey, although outside the Arab orbit, that has most inspiring to those leading the movements that have produced the Arab Spring. Public opinion polls in the region again and again rank Recip Tayyip Erdogan as the world’s most admired leader. It is a mistake to suggest that these movements will opt for ‘the Turkish model,’ as each national situation has its own originality, but all share a passionate insistence that destiny of the country will be shaped by its own people according to their values and aspirations, and without imitation of others. It is possible to learn from the Turkish experience in dealing with such tendentious issues as the future participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics or the desirability of pursuing a foreign policy based on ‘zero problems with neighbors’ while maintaining this fierce insistence on the nationalist character of political transformation.

 

At the same time, in a world lacking effective and legitimate global leadership, it would be a mistake to overlook the enormous contributions made by Turkish diplomacy over the course of the prior decade. AKP foreign policy, as principally shaped by Ahmet Davutoglu, provides a reasoned, peace oriented voice of intelligent moderation that draws upon deep historical and cultural affinities, and suggests a very different political profile than that associated with such other regional voices as those emanating from Iran and Saudi Arabia.

 

Such an affirmation of the AKP achievements is not meant to be an uncritical endorsement of its policies. There are disturbing features of its approach to internal dissent, including the imprisonment of a large number of its domestic critics, especially journalists, and recent examples of police brutality in responding to anti-government demonstrations. There are also widely discussed worries about Mr. Erdogan’s ambitions, contentions that he is a closet autocrat as well as an immensely skillful politician in the populist mode, and it might be reassuring to the electorate as a whole if the elections do not give the AKP a parliamentary two-thirds super-majority that would allow the amendment of the 1982 Constitution without the need for a ratifying referendum. The fear is that with such control, 376 members out of a total of 550, the AKP could push through a presidential system that would allow Mr. Erdogan to become the dominant political leader in the country for another ten years. However, a new constitution is necessary. There is little disagreement among the Turkish voters about the desirability of a new constitution to replace the outdated 1982 Constitution, a byproduct of military rule. Aside from its statist and ultra-nationalist features, the present Turkish constitution keeps alive unpleasant memories of repressive rule when abuse of the citizenry was the order of the day.

 

Secular Turks mainly worry about certain forms of constitutional reform that they fear will keep the AKP in power forever and will somehow challenge their European modernist life style by such measures as Internet censorship instilling Islamic morals with respect to sexual content or impose restrictions on the public availability of alcohol. In the background, as well, is an unresolved struggle for economic and cultural primacy among elites with different geographic and class roots in Turkish society, the AKP bringing to the fore new energies that come from the more traditional atmosphere of Anatolian towns and villages, as opposed to the CHP elites that are concentrated in the main urban centers of western Turkey: Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara.

 

Instead of telling Turks how to vote, The Economist might have more appropriately warned Turkish voters  (if their concern was the future wellbeing of the country) against the perils of the free market economy that the AKP has so enthusiastically endorsed, and especially encouraged while dramatically expanding trade with neighboring states, especially to its East.   Despite the impressive economic growth of recent years, there seems to be too great a readiness in Ankara to go along with the sort of neoliberal globalization that minimizes the regulation of markets, fails to address climate change, indulges speculative finance, and generates ever greater disparities between rich and poor within and among countries.

 

Even here in relation to the world economy the Turkish record is better than its harshest critics are ready to admit. Recently Turkey took over from Belgium, itself symbolic of a power ship on the global stage, as host for the next ten years of the UN efforts to assist the poorest countries in the world, known as the Least Developed Countries or LDCs. It hosted a mega-conference of 192 member states of the UN in Istanbul last month, and made it clear through statements by Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Davutoglu to the assembled delegations that Turkey’s vision of its role was to make sure that economic justice was being achieved through this UN process, an assessment that took issue with the efforts of the prior 40 years of grand rhetoric and miserable performance. Expressive of this intention, the Turkish Foreign Minister established an Intellectual Forum of independent academic specialists gathered from around the world that ran sessions parallel to the inter-governmental conference, offering a critical perspective on the entire UN approach to extreme poverty and societal vulnerability.

 

Perhaps, the greatest deficiency in the current Turkish political scene is not the quality of AKP leadership, but the absence of a responsible and credible opposition that offers the citizens some alternative policies on key questions. Until the current elections the main opposition party, Republican People’s Party (CHP), has been a party of ‘No,’ agitating secular anxieties about ‘a second Iran’ and withholding all appreciation for what the governing party has managed to achieve. Turkey, as with any vibrant democracy, needs a robust opposition, preferably with a genuine social democratic orientation, both to heighten the quality of policy debate and to make the electoral process more responsive to the values of and challenges facing Turkish society, but this will not be achieved at this stage by voting the AKP out of power. We have the impression that its new leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, seeks to move the party’s program and tactics in this direction, and he has moved away from the polarizing language and approach of the impoverishing Baykal period of CHP decline, but dislodging the old guard of the party has limited the adjustment. In contrast, the Erdogan leadership has exhibited a pragmatic capability to respond intelligently to changes in the political setting.

 

The Economist and others outside of Turkey should certainly be free to comment on AKP policies and the record of its government, but telling voters how to vote goes too far, and recalls the worst sides of the European relationship to the Middle East. We live in an increasingly integrated and interconnected political, economic, and cultural global space within which critical dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation are indispensable if the future holds any promise of becoming peaceful, fair, and sustainable for the peoples of the world. In this regard, it is crucial that the imperatives of such free expression be reconciled with respect for the dynamics of self-determination, above all the autonomy of national electoral procedures.  It is disappointing that Eurocentricism has not yet become an embarrassment for the editors of The Economist.

http://richardfalk.wordpress.com/   

bismillah

BismillahirRahmanirRahim

WHAT’S happened to higher education in California? Two academics there have attacked The Economist for presuming to advise the Turks how to vote in their forthcoming election. One is Richard Falk, Albert G Milbank Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University and Research Professor in Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Another is Hilal Elver, his wife, also at Santa Barbara.

They say:

The Economist leader headline in its June 4 issue is revealing: “The best way for Turks to promote democracy would be to vote against the ruling party.” It reveals a mentality that has not shaken itself free from the paternalism and entitlements of the bygone colonialist days. What makes such an assertion so striking is that The Economistwould know better than to advise US or Canadian or Israeli citizens how to vote. And it never did venture such an opinion on the eve of the election of such reactionary and militarist figures as George W Bush, Stephen Harper, or Binyamin Netanyahu. Are the people of Turkey really so politically backward as to require guidance from this bastion of Western elite opinion so as to learn what is in their own best interest?

What’s so peculiar is that anyone who has a glancing familiarity with this bastion of elite opinion knows that, for good or ill, it has indeed advised American, Canadian and Israeli citizens how to cast their votes. Don’t professors do any homework nowadays? As for all that “paternalism” nonsense, I was dimly under the impression that Turkey had a colonialist past of its own.

http://www.economist.com/blogs/lexington/2011/06/not-doing-your-homework

Turkey’s bitter election

On the last lap

The ruling party heads for re-election after a polarising campaign

Jun 9th 2011 | ISTANBUL | from the print edition

Waving a flag for the opposition

IT IS now official: women should have babies and stay at home. That was how feminists greeted this week’s announcement by Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that he would scrap the ministry for women, along with seven other cabinet jobs. Coming days before the June 12th election, it has raised fears that a third term for Mr Erdogan’s mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party could embrace a new puritanism.

Mr Erdogan suggests instead a ministry for “family and social policies…as we are a conservative democratic party, we need to strengthen the family structure.” His words set off alarm bells among those who recall the AK government’s previous efforts to criminalise adultery and Mr Erdogan’s calls for women to have at least three children. He is fiercely against day-care centres. Those who entrust their children to others, he said, would end up alone in old-age homes. “Do the maths,” snaps Hulya Gulbahar, a feminist lawyer. “He wants us to have three children and stay at home. In other words, no career for at least 15 years.”

Claims by the secular establishment that the AK party’s ultimate plan is to introducesharia law are plainly overblown. Yet such thinking lay behind the unsuccessful attempt by prosecutors to ban the AK party in 2008. Among its supposed crimes was seeking to ease restrictions on the Islamic-style headscarf in universities, which have kept thousands of pious women from pursuing their education. In fact, since it came to power in 2002, the AK government has pushed through unparalleled reforms, giving women more rights than ever. Rape inside marriage is now a criminal offence. Penalties for “honour killings” of women who mix with men to whom they are not married have been stiffened. But Ms Gulbahar, who helped craft some of these measures, complains that Mr Erdogan “turned” after being re-elected for a second term of single-party rule in 2007.

His increasingly prurient tone may have encouraged a climate that has led to the sacking of Zeynep Aksu, a psychiatrist at a social-services centre in the Black Sea province of Samsun, because she refused to stop wearing short skirts. In January a headmaster in the southern province of Mersin provoked a furore after ordering male students to remain at least 45 centimetres from their female peers. An inquiry was launched only after a parliamentarian from the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) petitioned the government. Yet the headmaster kept his job.

Binnaz Toprak, a sociologist running for parliament on the CHP ticket, published a survey last year arguing that such incidents reflect a countrywide lurch towards intolerance. She found that in many Anatolian provinces alcohol is no longer served and pressure to fast during Ramadan is on the rise. “The picture I encountered is truly alarming,” she concluded.

Yet there is another side to the story. As universities proliferate across the country, students from places like Izmir and Istanbul infect locals with their freewheeling ways. In Erzurum, an eastern backwater, girls and boys can be seen strolling hand in hand, for which they might until recently have been flogged. In Istanbul veiled girls can be spotted snogging with boyfriends on park benches. Sometimes, in short, Turkey seems to be growing simultaneously more conservative and more liberal.

A greater worry is Mr Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian bent. Turkey has more imprisoned journalists than almost any other country (there were some 57 at the last count). A pair of students who unfurled a banner saying “we want free education” during a speech by Mr Erdogan have languished in jail for over a year on charges of “membership of a terrorist group.” And Mr Erdogan is increasingly fond of blasting his critics in public.

In the past week, this newspaper has been a target for daring to suggest in our June 4th issue that Turks should vote for the CHP to deny the AK party the two-thirds majority it needs unilaterally to rewrite the constitution. At successive rallies Mr Erdogan has accused The Economist of acting in concert with “a global gang” and taking orders from Israel. This may win him votes at home, but it will hardly add to his credibility in the West.

June 10th, 2011 – The Economist

bismillah

BismillahirRahmanirRahim

Biz Allah’ı görmüyoruz ama O bizi görüyor. O, bizim gizlediklerimizi de biliyor, beynimizdeki düşünce ve niyetleri, kalbimizdeki duyguları hep biliyor.

Allah bize Peygamber göndermiş, Kitab ve Din yollamış, doğru yolu göstermiş. Biz Müslümanlar da evet inandık demişiz. Artık mazeretimiz kalmamış.

Hem iman ettik diyoruz, hem de Kitab’a aykırı işler yapıyoruz.

Hem Peygamber’e inandık diyoruz, hem onun öğütlerini tutmuyoruz, sünnetine uymuyoruz.

Mazeretimiz yok.

Kendimizi dine uyduracağımıza, dini kendimize uydurmaya kalkıyoruz. Ne büyük çarpıklık ve sapıklık!..

Kur’anda en fazla tekrarlanan emir namaz kılmak. Bizim yüzde doksanımız namazı terk etmiş.

Kur’an azgınlıklardan uzak durunuz buyuruyor. Bizim toplumumuz azgınlık içinde.

Kur’an bize, birlik ve beraberlik içinde tek bir Ümmet olun, sakın ayrılıp parçalanmayın, sonra rüzgarınız gider diyor, biz bin parçaya ayrılmışız, birbirimizle çekişip tepişiyoruz.

Kur’an bizi dünyanın faniliği, hile ve oyunları, aldatması konusunda uyarıyor, biz kulak asmıyoruz.

Kendimizi iyi, olgun, gerçek Müslüman sanıyoruz.

Bu memlekette geçim sıkıntısından insanlar intihar ediyor, biz gerçek ve olgun Müslümanlar olsaydık böyle facialar yaşanır mıydı?

Şu çılgın bir lüks, israf, sefahat (beyinsizlik), gurur, kibir içinde yaşayan sözde Müslümanlara bakınız. Onlarda kuş kadar akıl olsaydı böyle yaparlar mıydı?

İslam dini, Kitabullah, Peygamber, Şeriat rüşveti kesin olarak yasaklamış. Alnı secde gören şu rüşvetçiler güruhuna bakınız. Veyl onlara!..

İrtidadın, dinsizlik ve densizliğin, fısk ve isyanın, günahın, tuğyanın genelleştiği şu ülkede, iki ay sonra Ramazan’da birtakım sahte dindarların yine ne haltlar yiyeceğini göreceğiz.

Ramazan etkinlikleri ve eğlenceleri, vur patlasın çal oynasın şenlikler. Evlere şenlik!..

Bozuk ve sapık bir düzende bu ne şamata, bu ne çılgınlık, bu ne sorumsuzluk…

Bizim şaşkınlar ve gafiller bozuk düzenin nimetleriyle semirdiler, bir elleri yağda bir elleri balda ya, gelecek çok pembe, memleket çok iyiye gidiyor onlara göre. Ya öyle mi?

Şehir seher vaktinde leşler gibi uyuyor. Binlerce camiden avaz avaz ezan okunuyor, camilerde birkaç ihtiyardan başka cemaat yok. Sonra da durumumuz pek parlakmış. Ya öyle mi?

Zekatlar öncelikle Müslüman fakirlerin, miskinlerin, gurbette sefalete düşmüş mültecilerin eline geçmiyor, kapanın elinde kalıyor. Birileri zekatlarla Trinidat’ta hizmet ediyorlarmış… Aman ne hizmet ne hizmet!..

Ümmet şuuru ve birliği elden gitmiş.

Müslümanların başında, kendisine itaat ve biat edilen bir İmam veya Emir yok.

Darü’l-Hilafe İstanbul, kahpe Babil’e dönmüş.

Riba ve faiz denizinde yüzüyoruz.

Kandil geceleri göğe maytab atılıyor ya, işler yolunda…

Başına renkli bir örtü bağla ve sonra istediğini yap. İslam böyle mi diyor? Şer’i tesettür bu mudur?

Düzen bozuk ya, çal çalabildiğin kadar.

Kasımiye medresesinde çanlar çalar, ezanlar okunurken havuzun üzerinden papazlar, hahamlar, müftüler merasimle geçmişlerdi. Aman ne Müslümanlık ne Müslümanlık.

Her yerde eski kiliseler restore ediliyor. Taksim’e cami yapılmasına gelince, ses seda yok.

Doğrusu iki binli yılların Müslümanları bir tuhaf, bir acayip.

Hem Kur’an okuyorlar, hem bildiklerini okuyorlar.

Kur’anı ve İslam’ı bilenler ne yapıyor? Büyük kısmı seyrine bakıyor.

Vah vah, tüh tüh, eyvah!..