Misc Thoughts



By , nytimes.com
Published: February 24, 2013

ISTANBUL — When flight attendants first rode aboard Turkish Airlines in the late 1940s they wore cotton blouses under blue suits tailored to accentuate “the contours of the body,” as a fashion history of the airline puts it. In the ’60s and ’70s the trend continued with fashions straight off the Paris runway, designed to show Turkey’s European flair on its flagship airline.

The designer Dilek Hanif’s proposed uniforms, which have caused an uproar over how the country’s flagship carrier is perceived.

Now, the country’s shifting mores are reflected in a proposed new look: long dresses, skirts below the knee and Ottoman-style fez caps.

This being Turkey, where seemingly trifling matters can become bitter contests over identity, mock-ups leaked to the news media have caused quite a stir, eliciting passionate reactions from the secular and the pious, and from those who support the traditions of modern Turkey and others who are nostalgic for the days of the Ottoman Empire.

On Twitter, some Turks mocked the new uniforms as reminiscent of the costumes worn in “Magnificent Century,” a popular Turkish soap opera about the decadent reign of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in the 16th century. The dispute was only heightened after the airline said it was banning alcohol on some domestic and international flights.

Others slammed the new look as too conservative, a transparent effort to please the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The party’s decade-long run in power has wrought changes in the traditionally secular culture, like the acceptance of Islamic head scarves in public and on college campuses and restrictions on alcohol in certain places.

“It is a reaction against imposing a certain lifestyle to all institutions in Turkey,” said Ayse Saktanber, a sociologist at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. “Turkey is a pragmatic society which doesn’t like to fall behind the world. These new costumes came with the alcohol ban on planes.”

She added, “even my students with head scarves find these ridiculous.”

In a statement to the local news media, Turkish Airlines tried to mute the uproar, saying that the design was leaked prematurely and that it is just one option among many being considered. “Among those that reinterpret traditional Turkish designs, there are also others that stick out with their modernist approach.”

That Turkish Airlines has now become a locus of the country’s culture wars is perhaps not surprising, given that the airline is considered something of a national treasure by many Turks. This is particularly true of secularists, who see it as presenting the face of Turkey to the world. They recall that it was founded under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey who instituted secularism with an iron hand and banned the fez, among other symbols of Ottoman times.

With Turkey’s rise as an economic and political power over the past decade, tourism has soared. Feeding some of the backlash against the new uniforms is the fear that tourists, many of whom form their first impressions of Turkey on a Turkish Airlines flight, will get the wrong impression. And for all the talk of Turkey pivoting from the West and becoming a new leader of the Muslim world, the flight schedules tell a different narrative: in January nearly four times as many passengers flew to Europe as to the Middle East.

Some feel that Turkish Airlines, nearly 50-percent-owned by the government, is simply trying to please Mr. Erdogan, who, when he is not being accused by his opponents of being a strict Islamist, is referred to as a latter-day sultan for his accrual of power.

“Turkish Airlines is leaning toward a more conservative line,” said Serdar Tasci, a sociologist who also works as a consultant to the main secular political party, the Republican People’s Party, or C.H.P. “On the one hand it is trying to be a global brand, and on the other it is allying with the neoconservative policies of the political power.”

In a written statement, the chairman of Turkish Airlines’ board of directors did not deny that the airline was doing the government’s bidding. In fact, he adamantly confirmed it. “The Turkish Airlines vision matches with our government’s vision,” said the chairman, Hamdi Topcu. “There is no difference between them and us. It is the government that appointed us.”

He added, “The Turkish Republic’s government, which came to power with democratic elections and gained the confidence of its people, represents this country’s values.”

In a sense, Mr. Tasci said, the stir caused by the uniform designs is just a new twist in a perpetual conflict here. “There has been a cultural clash here” for the last 200 years, Mr. Tasci said. “But now they are bringing back the old as something new, and that is increasing the conflict.”

Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the chairman of the C.H.P., said in an interview that “it’s just not possible for them to go ahead with the designs that were leaked to the papers. This airline represents Turkey’s image.”

The uproar has cast a spotlight on the Turkish designer Dilek Hanif, who was commissioned by the airline to redesign the uniforms. Ms. Hanif seems to encapsulate the divides and diversity of Turkey’s culture. A favorite of the Paris haute couture scene, her clothes are often inspired by Ottoman fashions, and she is said to be a favorite of Turkey’s head-scarf-wearing first lady, Hayrunnisa Gul.

In an interview, Ms. Hanif said the uniform designs that appeared online were not final. She attributed the negative reaction — especially from those who found no deeper cultural meaning and simply called the designs ugly — to the callousness of the fashion industry, apparently as fierce in Istanbul as it is in New York, Paris and Milan.

“Contrary to the photos that were leaked,” she said, “we are also working on a range of modern designs.”

Yildirim Mayruk, another Turkish designer, was quoted in the Turkish news media as saying, “even if they are not finalized I think it is a disgrace to design them.” Evoking the legacy of Ataturk’s secularist ideology, referred to as Kemalism, he added, “how right is it for a Kemalist woman to design such clothes?”

Ms. Hanif said her designs have always been a “synthesis of East and West,” and is none too happy about being thrust to the front lines of Turkey’s culture wars.

“I am still working on different designs, colors and alternatives,” she said. “When the designs are finished, they will be presented to Turkey and the world.”

Ceylan Yeginsu and Yesim Erdem contributed reporting.



Go ahead, picture a religious Jew.

Now picture a Muslim cleric.

Now an Amish farmer.

What do they have in common? Beards. And not neatly trimmed beards, but, in the popular stereotype, long, unruly beards, which connote piety, spiritual intensity and a life so hard at study that there is no time for a shave. The scholar, the mystic, the terrorist, the holy man — they all have beards.

Last month, the connection between hirsuteness and religiosity appeared in federal court, not for the first time. In this latest case, a federal court refused to consider the appeal of a Jewish prisoner in New Hampshire who had bristled against regulations limiting his beard to a quarter-inch.

In upholding a 2010 summary judgment against the prisoner, Albert Kuperman, convicted in 2002 of sexually molesting a minor, the First Circuit panel did not disagree that Mr. Kuperman had a religious obligation to refrain from shaving. But it concluded, in a decision issued July 14, that “alternative means remained open for Kuperman to exercise the constitutionally protected right at issue.” The prison, in other words, had to allow Mr. Kuperman, who has since been released, some avenue for religious observance, but not every avenue.

Being bearded is just one of many obligations that some strictly religious Jewish men uphold. Only one of the Torah’s 613 commandments applies to facial hair, and scholars disagree on the commandment’s interpretation.

But the beard is integral to many men’s religious identities, not just religious Jews’. The beard, especially the really big beard, constitutes a look, one that dictates how they are perceived by the world.

“Do not cut the hair at the sides of your head or clip off the edges of your beard,” according to Leviticus 19:27. That commandment has produced reams of rabbinic commentary. Some traditional Jews believe only the chin must remain unshaven. Others argue the unshaven area is larger, and some teachings hold that the prohibition against shaving extends to the neck. Rabbis draw distinctions between shaving (forbidden) and practices like cutting the hair with scissors, plucking it with tweezers and removing it with depilatories (depending on whom you ask, possibly permitted).

But to focus on the legalisms misses the point. In many religious communities, the beard is the man’s ID badge, his sign of membership. Like the Hasid’s black hat or the Muslim’s kufi, it’s what he acquires when he joins the community, and it’s what he gets rid of when he leaves. It is a form of religious garb, with different versions in different religious tribes.

According to Steven D. Reschly, who teaches history at Truman State University in Missouri, Amish men’s beards, without mustaches, are not religiously commanded. Their only ritual function is to distinguish married men, who wear beards, from single men, who do not. (The Amish do not wear wedding rings.) They are mainly a tradition, around which legends sprout like whiskers.

“The standard story is that the Amish do not wear mustaches or buttons because mustaches and brass buttons were associated with the French military in the 18th century,” Dr. Reschly wrote in an e-mail. “Amish men will sometimes tell you that they think Amish women got rid of the mustaches on their men because they did not like to kiss their husbands with all that hair on the upper lip.”

The beards, which, according to Dr. Reschly, “reflect late 17th- and early 18th-century rural clothing and grooming patterns in northwestern Switzerland and northeastern France,” honor the past and its folkways.

“They indicate respect for tradition, refusal to recognize changing fashions, and in general nonconformity to the world, all of which do have spiritual significance in the Amish world view,” Dr. Reschly wrote.

The beard has a long history in the Islamic world, but as with the Amish, the tradition is not commanded by Scripture. Rather, it seems to originate in a hadith, or saying, from the prophet Muhammad.

“There is nothing specific in the Koran that tells people to wear beards,” said Adnan Zulfiqar, the Muslim spiritual adviser at the University of Pennsylvania. “Mainly it derives from prophetic traditions, particularly one in which a non-Muslim delegation came to the prophet, and he was taken aback by their appearance, and he made this statement that you leave your beard but trim your mustaches.”

Mr. Zulfiqar said clerics disagreed on whether the beard was obligatory for Muslim men. “The more conservative you are, the more likely to see it as obligatory.” Those who would require the beard disagree over how long it should be, he said.

But all over the Muslim world, the full beard has come to connote piety and spiritual fervor. It is such a powerful cultural signifier, in fact, that it inspires non-Muslims, too.

“We have the Muslim beard, known as the ‘Sunni beard’ here in Philadelphia,” Mr. Zulfiqar said. “The iteration,” he added, “is pretty long and scraggly, and it has become part of the fashion here. In urban Philadelphia, you will see ‘Sunni beards’ being worn by non-Muslims as well. It’s become part of urban culture, particularly among African-Americans. They wear really scraggly, unkempt beards, and it is considered aesthetically pleasing and fashionable. And you don’t have to be Muslim.”

Of course, the beard is only a sign of righteousness. It is no guarantor, as Mr. Zulfiqar reminds us:

“I recall one gentleman who came back from a trip to Pakistan and remarked to me, ‘I learned one thing: the longer the beard, the bigger the crook.’ His anticipation was people with big beards would be really honest, but he kept meeting people lying to him.”

By MARK OPPENHEIMER, Published: August 6, 2011, nytimes.com






Lookups spiked on February 25, 2011.


The actor Charlie Sheen called a radio show and offered his strong opinions on various subjects, including the creator and writer of “Two and a Half Men”:

“And this charlatan chose not to do his job, which is to write.”

charlatan is a fraud or a faker. The word comes from Italian, where it means “a person who prattles or chatters” – a person whose words should not be believed.

(Charlatan was originally the name for a person from the village of Cerreto, Italy, but we’re not sure how those villagers got a reputation for being untrustworthy.)



Namik Kemal Zeybek bey – Ahmed Yesevi Vakfi Baskani:

Gercek mutasavviflar ayni zamanda akil bilimlerinde de alimdiler.

Video’yu izleyiniz…




Allah sirat uzerinde yedi noktada kullarina yedi soru soracaktir:

1. Soru iman’dan,

2. Soru namazlardan,

3. Soru Ramazan orucundan,

4. Soru zekat verip vermediginden,

5. Soru Hac edip etmediginden,

6. Soru Ana Baba hakkindan,

7. Soru iyilikle emredip fenaliktan men edip etmedigine dair olacaktir.

Sorulara cevap veren daha ileriye gececek, cevap veremeyenler o yerde bin sene durdurulup azab cektikten sonra oradan cehenneme atilacaklardir.

Din Dersleri, Seyh Nazim Kibrisi (Agustos 2010/Ramazan 1426)



Hadisler, ana babaya itaatin Allah’a itaat oldugunu, onlara karsi edepsizligin ise yuce Allah’i gazaba getirecegini belirtir. (Tirmizi, Birr, 2; Hakim, Mustedrek, IV, 152)

Manevi doguma vesile olan mursit hurmeti hak etmis demektir. Ona hurmetsizlik haramdir. (Sarani, a.g.e. I, 189-190)

Ana-babaya iyilik, dinimizin insana yüklediği en büyük, yapılması gerekli olan vazifelerdendirOnlara can sıkıntısı ile “üf” demek bile haram kılınmıştırBinaenaleyh, ana–babaya isyan ve eza etmek büyük günahlardandırAbdurrahman bEbû Bekre (RA), babasından yaptığı rivayete göre bir kere HzPeygamber (SAV) Efendimiz ashaba üç defa:

– Büyük günahların en büyüğünü size haber vereyim mi? buyurduAshab da:

– Evet bildir, Yâ Resûlellah, dediResûlullah (SAV) Efendimiz de:

– ALLAH Teâlâ’ya şirk koşmak, ana–babaya isyan ve eza etmektir, buyurduHzPeygamber (SAV) Efendimiz dayanmakta iken oturdu da: – Dikkat edin, iyi dinleyin! Bir de yalan söz ve yalan şahitliğidirDikkat edin! Bir de yalan söz ve yalan şahitliğidir, buyurdu ve bu sözü durmadan tekrar tekrar söylüyordu ki, hatta biz Resûl-i Ekrem (SAV)’e acıyarak:

– Keşke sussa, dedik(Buharî, Şehadet: 10, Edeb: 6, İsti’zan: 35, Eyman: 16, Diyat: 2, İstitabe: 1, Müslim; İman: 143, Tirmizi, Birr: 4, Tefsir sûre: 4, 4-7, Neseî, Tahrim: 4, Kasame: 49, Darimi, Diyat: 9, AbHanbel, 5/36, 38-413)

Abdullah İbn-i Amr (RA)’den rivayete göre, Resûlullah (SAV) Efendimiz şöyle buyurdu:

“Rabbin rızası, ana-babanın rızasındadırRabbin gazabı da ana-babanın gazabındadır” (Tirmizi, Birr: 3, Hakim, Müstedrek, 4/152)

Ebû’d-Derda (RA)’dan rivayete göre, Resûlullah (SAV) Efendimiz şöyle buyurdu: “Ana ve baba cennet kapılarının tam ortasıdırİstersen o kapıyı muhafaza et, istersen zayi et” (Tirmizi, Birr: 3, Hakim, Müstedrek, 2/197, 4/152)

Abdullah İbn-i Amr (RA)’dan rivayete göre, Resûlullah (SAV) Efendimiz şöyle buyurdu: “Söz taşıyan, (ana–babasına) karşı gelen ve içki içmeye devam eden kişi cennete giremez” (Nesei, Eşribe: 46, Zekât: 69, Darimi, Eşribe: 5)

Bu arada önemle şunu belirtelim ki: Ana-babaya ihsan bu kadar yüksek bir görev olmakla beraber, bu görev hiçbir zaman ALLAH Teâlâ’ya ortak koşmayı gerekli kılmamalıdırYani ana-baba, evlatlarının ALLAH Teâlâ’ya isyan etmesiyle memnun olacaklar ise, onları bu şekilde memnun etmeye çalışmak, ALLAH Teâlâ’ya şirk manasına geleceğinden yasaklanmıştır ve haramdırEvet, ALLAH Teâlâ’ya isyanı ve günahı, inkâr ve şirki gerektiren hususlarda ana-babanın emrine itaat edilmezNitekim Cenâb-ı Hak şöyle buyurur: “Eğer onlar seni, hakkında bilgin olmayan bir şeyi (körü körüne) Bana ortak koşman için zorlarlarsa, onlara itaat etmeOnlarla dünyada iyi geçinBana yönelenlerin yoluna uySonunda dönüşünüz ancak BanadırO zaman size, yapmış olduklarınızı haber veririm” (Lokman sûresi: 15)

“Biz insana, ana babasına iyi davranmasını tavsiye etmişizdirEğer onlar seni, hakkında bilgin olmayan bir şeyi (körü körüne) Bana ortak koşman için zorlarlarsa, onlara itaat etmeDönüşünüz ancak BanadırO zaman size yapmış olduklarınızı haber vereceğim” (Ankebût sûresi:8)

HzAli (RA)’dan rivayete göre HzPeygamber (SAV) Efendimiz de: “–ALLAH Teâlâ’ya isyan hususunda (hiçbir kimseye) itaat yokturİtaat ancak meşrû konulardadır” (Müslim, İmare:39) buyurmuşlardır

Abdullah bÖmer (RA)’den rivayet edilen diğer bir hadis-i şerifte de Resûlullah (SAV):

“-Müslüman bir kimseye, hoşuna giden veya gitmeyen her hususta (amirini) dinleyip itaat etmek gerekirAncak, bir masiyetle (ALLAH Teâlâ’ya isyan) emredilmişse o müstesna!Eğer bir masiyet emredilmişse ne dinlemek vardır, ne de itaat, buyurmuşlardır” (Müslim, İmare:38, Tirmizi, Cihad: 29, Davud, Cihad: 86, Neseî, Bey’at: 34)

Zikredilen ayet-i kerime ve hadis-i şeriflerin açık delâletinden şunu anlıyoruz:

ALLAH Teâlâ’ya isyanı gerektiren hususlarda hiçbir kimseye itaat edilmezBir haramı işlemeyi veya bir farzı terketmeyi emreden amirin emri, ona itaat eden memuru mesuliyetten kurtaramaz

İbnu Amr (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Bir adam, cihada iştirak etmek için Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’den izin istedi. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Annen baban sağlar mı?” diye sordu. Adam: “Evet” deyince: “Onlara (hizmet de cihad sayılır), sen onlara hizmet ederek cihad yap” buyurdu.

Buhârî, Cihâd 138, Edeb 3; Müslim, Birr 5, (2539); Ebu Dâvud, Cihad, 33, (2529); Nesâî, Cihad 5; Tirmizî, Cihad 2, (1671).

Behz İbnu Hakîm babası tarikiyle dedesi Mu’aviye İbnu Hayde el-Kuşeyrî (radıyallahu anh)’den naklediyor. Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’e: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü, kime iyilik yapayım? diye sordum. Bana: “Annene” dedi. “Sonra kime?” diye tekrar ettim. “Annene” dedi. “Sonra kime?” dedim. “Annene” dedi. “Sonra kime?” dedim, bu dördüncüde “Babana, sonra da tedrici yakınlarına” diye cevap verdi.”

Ebu Dâvud, Edeb 129, (5141); Tirmizî Birr 1, (1898).

152 – Ebu Hüreyre (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: Bir adam gelerek: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü iyi davranıp hoş sohbette bulunmama en ziyaâde kim hak sâhibidir?” diye sordu. Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Annen!” diye cevap verdi. Adam: “Sonra kim?” dedi, Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) “Annen!” diye cevap verdi. Adam tekrar: “Sonra kim?” dedi Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) yine: “Annen!” diye cevap verdi. Adam tekrar sordu: “Sonra kim?” Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) bu dördüncüyü: “Baban!” diye cevapladı.”     Buhârî, Edeb 2; Müslim, Birr 1, (2548).

Ebu Hüreyre (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) bir gün: “Burnu sürtülsün, burnu sürtülsün, burnu sürtülsün” dedi. “Kimin burnu sürtülsün ey Allah’ın Resûlü?” diye sorulunca şu açıklamada bulundu: “Ebeveyninden her ikisinin veya sâdece birinin yaşlılığına ulaştığı halde cennete giremeyenin.”

Müslim, Birr 9, (251); Tirmizî, Daavât 110 (3539).

Muâviye İbnu Câhime’nin anlattığına göre; Câhime (radıyallahu anh) Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’e gelir ve: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü, ben gazveye (cihad) katılmak istiyorum, bu konuda sizinle istişâre etmeye geldim” der. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Annen var mı?” diye sorar. “Evet” deyince, “Öyleyse ondan ayrılma zira cennet onun ayağının altındadır” buyurur.

Nesâî, Cihad 6, (6, 11).

Ebu’d-Derda (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Baba cennetin orta kapısıdır. Dilersen bu kapıyı terket dilersen muhafaza et” dediğini işittim.

Tirmizî, Birr, 3, (1901). Tirmizî, hadise “sahih” dedi.

Ebu Üseyd Mâlik İbnu Rebî’a es-Sâidî (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Bir adam: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü, anne ve babamın vefatlarından sonra da onlara iyilik yapma imkânı var mı, ne ile onlara iyilik yapabilirim?” diye sordu. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Evet vardır” dedi ve açıkladı: “Onlara dua, onlar için Allah’tan istiğfar (günahlarının affedilmesini) taleb etmek, onlardan sonra vasiyetlerini yerine getirmek, anne ve babasının akrabalarına karşı da sıla-i rahmi ifa etmek, anne ve babanın dostlarına ikramda bulunmak.”

Ebu Dâvud, Edeb 129, (5142); İbnu Mâce, Edeb 2, (3664).

Hz. Ebu Hureyre radıyallahu anh anlatıyor: “Reslulullah aleyhissalâtu vesselâm buyurdular ki: “Kıntâr onikibin okiyyedir. Her okiyye, yerle gök arasında bulunan şeylerin hepsinden hayırlıdır.”

Yine Resülullah aleyhissalâtu vesselâm buyurdular ki: “Kişinin ahirette derecesi yükseltilir. Bunun üzerine: “Bu yükselme (hakkım değildi), nereden gelmedir?” der. Kendisine: “Bu senin için evladının yaptığı istiğfar sebebiyledir” denilir.”

Zeyd İbnu Erkam (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) buyurdu ki: “Kim ebeveyninden birine bedel haccederse, bu haccla onun borcunu ödemiş olur. Bu durum semâdaki ruhuna müjdelenir. Kişi, anne ve babasına karşı isyankâr (âkk) bile olsa (bu iyiliği sebebiyle) Allah’ın nezdinde (iyi kullar meyanında) yazılır.”

Diğer bir rivayette ise: “Babası için bir hacc, kendisi için yedi hacc yazılır” denmiştir.

Bu rivayeti Rezîn tahric etti. Bu rivayet Heysemî’nin Mecmau’z-Zevâid’inde, Taberâni’nin Mu’cemu’l-Kebir’inden kaydedilmiştir (3, 282).

Ebu Bekre radıyallahu anh anlatıyor: “Resülullah aleyhissalâtu vesselâm: “Size büyük günahların en büyüğünü haber vereyim mi?” buyurmuş ve bunu üç kere tekrar etmişlerdi. Biz: “Evet!” deyince:

“Allah’a şirk koşmak, anne ve baba haklarına riayetsizlik, cana kıymak!” buyurdular. Bu sırada dayanmış durumda idi, yere oturup:

“Haberiniz olsun! Yalan söz, yalan şahidlik!” dedi ve bunu o kadar tekrar etti ki, “Keşke kesse artık!” temennisinde bulunduk.”  Buhâri, Şehâdât 10, Edeb 6, İsti’zân 35, İstitâbe 1; Müslim, İmân 143, (87); Tirmizi, Şehâdât 3, (2302).

İbnu Amr İbni’I-As radıyallahu anhüma anlatıyor: “Resulûllah aleyhissalâtu vesselâm:  “Kişinin anne ve babasına sövmesi büyük günahlardandır!” buyurmuşlardı. Orada bulunanlar:

“Hiç kişi anne ve babasına söver mi?” dediler.

“Evet! Kişi, bir başkasının babasına söver, o da babasına söver; annesine söver, o da bunun annesine söver!” buyurdular.”   Buhâri, Edeb 4; Müslim, İmân 146, (90); Tirmizi, Birr 4, (1903); Ebu Dâvud, Edeb 129, (5141).

İbnu Ömer radıyallahu anhüma anlatıyor: “Resûlullah aleyhissalâtu vesselâm buyurdular ki:

“Üç kişi vardır, Kıyamet günü Allah onlara nazar etmez: Anne ve babasının hukukuna riayet etmeyen kimse, erkekleşen kadın ve deyyûs kimse.”

Nesâî, Zekat 69, (5, 81).

Yine Nesâî’nin bir rivayetinde Resûlullah şöyle buyurmuştur:

“Üç kişi vardır, cennete girmeyecektir: Anne babasının hukukuna riayet etmeyen kimse; içki düşkünü olan kimse; verdiğini başa kakan kimse.”

Nesâî, Zekat 69, (5, 81).

İbnu Selame es-Sülemî radıyallahu anh anlatıyor:

“Resülullah aleyhissalatu vesselam buyurdular ki: “Kişiye annesi(nin hakkına riayeti) tavsiye ederim. Kişiye annesi(nin hakkına riayeti) tavsiye ederim. Kişiye annesi(nin hakkına riayeti) tavsiye ederim” -diye üç kere tekrar etti. Sonra şöyle devam etti:- “Kişiye babası(nın hakkına riayeti) tavsiye ederim, kişiye kendi yerine işini takip eden velisi(nin hakkına riayeti) tavsiye ederim, hatta velisi kendisine eza vermiş bile olsa.”

EBEVEYNE İYİLİK – Ebu Hüreyre (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: Bir adam gelerek: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü iyi davranıp hoş sohbette bulunmama en ziyaâde kim hak sâhibidir?” diye sordu. Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Annen!” diye cevap verdi. Adam: “Sonra kim?” dedi, Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) “Annen!” diye cevap verdi. Adam tekrar: “Sonra kim?” dedi Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) yine: “Annen!” diye cevap verdi. Adam tekrar sordu: “Sonra kim?” Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) bu dördüncüyü: “Baban!” diye cevapladı.” Buhârî, Edeb 2; Müslim, Birr 1, (2548). 

– Küleyb İbnu Menfa’a ceddi bulunan Küleyb el-Hanefi (radıyallahu anh)’den anlattığına göre, kendisi Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’a gelerek sormuştur: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü kime karşı iyilik yapayım?” Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) şu cevabı vermiştir: “Annene, babana, kızkardeşine, oğlan kardeşine, bunu takip eden azadlına. Bu iyiliği de, üzerine vâcib olan bir hakkın ödenmesi, yani, sıla-ı rahmin yerine getirilmesi olarak yapacaksın. (Nafile, ihtiyarî, hasbî bir davranış tatavvu grubuna giren bir amel olarak değil)”.

Ebu Dâvud, Edeb 129, (5140).

– Behz İbnu Hakîm babası tarikiyle dedesi Mu’aviye İbnu Hayde el-Kuşeyrî (radıyallahu anh)’den naklediyor. Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’e: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü, kime iyilik yapayım? diye sordum. Bana: “Annene” dedi. “Sonra kime?” diye tekrar ettim. “Annene” dedi. “Sonra kime?” dedim. “Annene” dedi. “Sonra kime?” dedim, bu dördüncüde “Babana, sonra da tedrici yakınlarına
nlarına” diye cevap verdi.”

Ebu Dâvud, Edeb 129, (5141); Tirmizî Birr 1, (1898).

Ebu Dâvud bir rivayette şu ziyadeyi kaydeder: “Haberiniz olsun, kişi azatlısından bir fazlasını istese, azadlı (mevlâ) bu (ihtiyaç fazlası)na sâhib olduğu halde yerine getirmese kıyamet günü vermemiş olduğu bu fazlalık bir engerek yılanı olarak kendisine getirilir.”

– Abdullah İbnu Amr İbnu’l-Âs (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Bir adam: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü benim malım ve bir de çocuğum var. Babam malımı almak istiyor” (ne yapayım?) diye sordu. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Sen ve malın babana aitsiniz. Şunu bilin ki, evladlarınız kazançlarınızın en temizlerindendir. Öyle ise evladlarınızın kazançlarından yiyin” buyurdu.”

Ebu Dâvud, Büyü 79, (3530); İbnu Mâce, Ticârât 64, (2291)-2292).

– Ebu Hüreyre (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) bir gün: “Burnu sürtülsün, burnu sürtülsün, burnu sürtülsün” dedi. “Kimin burnu sürtülsün ey Allah’ın Resûlü?” diye sorulunca şu açıklamada bulundu: “Ebeveyninden her ikisinin veya sâdece birinin yaşlılığına ulaştığı halde cennete giremeyenin.”

Müslim, Birr 9, (251); Tirmizî, Daavât 110 (3539). Rivayetin yukarıdaki metni, Müslim’deki metindir.

– Ebu Hüreyre (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: Hiçbir evlad, babasının hakkını, bir istisna durumu dışında ödeyemez. O durum da şudur: Babasını köle olarak bulur, satın alır ve âzad eder.”

Müslim, Itk 25, (1510); Ebu Dâvud, Edeb 129, (5137); Tirmizî, Birr 8, (1907); İbnu Mâce, Edeb 1, (3659).

– Abdullah İbnu Amr İbni’l-Âs (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) şöyle buyurdu: “Allah’ın rızası babanın rızasından geçer. Allah’ın memnuniyetsizliği de babanın memnuniyetsizliğinden geçer.”

Tirmizî, Birr 3 (1900).

Tirmizi bu hadisi hem Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’in sözü (merfu) olarak, hem de sahâbî sözü (mevkuf) olarak rivayet eder. Ayrıca mevkuf olarak rivayet eden tarîkin sahih olduğunu söyler.

– İbnu Amr (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Bir adam, cihada iştirak etmek için Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’den izin istedi. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Annen baban sağlar mı?” diye sordu. Adam: “Evet” deyince: “Onlara (hizmet de cihad sayılır), sen onlara hizmet ederek cihad yap” buyurdu.

Buhârî, Cihâd 138, Edeb 3; Müslim, Birr 5, (2539); Ebu Dâvud, Cihad, 33, (2529); Nesâî, Cihad 5; Tirmizî, Cihad 2, (1671).

Müslim’in bir diğer rivayetinde adam: “…Sana, hicret ve cihad etmek ecrini de Allah’tan istemek şartı üzerine biat ediyorum” der. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Anne ve babandan sağ olan var mı?” diye sorar. Adam: “Evet, her ikisi de sağ” deyince: “Yani sen Allah’tan ecir istiyorsun?” der. Adamın “evet”i üzerine: “Öyleyse vâlideyn’in yanına dön. Onlara iyi bak, (Allah’ın rızası ondadır)” emreder.

Ebu Dâvud ve Nesâî’de gelen bir diğer rivayette adam: “Ağlamakta olan ebeveynimi de geride bıraktım” der. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) ona “Yemen’de bir kimsen var mı?” diye sordu. Adam: “Ebeveynim var” deyince “Peki, onlar sana izin verdiler mi? diye tekrar sordu. “Hayır” cevabı üzerine: “Öyleyse onlara geri dön, onlardan izin iste. Şâyet izin verirlerse cihada katıl, vermezlerse onlara hizmet et!” emretti.”

– Muâviye İbnu Câhime’nin anlattığına göre; Câhime (radıyallahu anh) Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’e gelir ve: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü, ben gazveye (cihad) katılmak istiyorum, bu konuda sizinle istişâre etmeye geldim” der. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Annen var mı?” diye sorar. “Evet” deyince, “Öyleyse ondan ayrılma zira cennet onun ayağının altındadır” buyurur.

Nesâî, Cihad 6, (6, 11).

– İbnu Ömer (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Nikâhım altında bir kadın vardı ve onu seviyordum da. Babam Ömer ise, onu sevmiyordu. Bana: “Boşa onu” dedi. Ben itiraz ettim ve boşamadım. Babam Ömer (radıyallahu anh) Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’e gelerek durumu arzetti. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) bana: “Boşa onu” dedi.

Ebu Dâvud, edeb 129, (5138); Tirmizî, Talâk 13, (1189). Tirmizî hadisin sahih olduğunu da belirtti.

– Ebu’d-Derda (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Baba cennetin orta kapısıdır. Dilersen bu kapıyı terket dilersen muhafaza et” dediğini işittim.

Tirmizî, Birr, 3, (1901). Tirmizî, hadise “sahih” dedi.

– Büreyde (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Bir kadın: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü, ben anneme bir cariye tasadduk etmiştim. Şimdi annem öldü” dedi. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Sadaka yapmış olmanın) ecrini mutlaka alacaksın. Miras yoluyla cariye sana geri gelecek (tekrar senin olacak)” buyurdu. Kadın: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü annemin bir aylık oruç borcu vardı, onun yerine tutabilir miyim?” diye sordu. “Annene bedel tut!” dedi. Kadın: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü, annem hiç haccetmedi, onun yerine hac yapabilir miyim?” diye sordu Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Evet, ona bedel haccet” buyurdu.”

Müslim, Sıyam 157, (1149); Tirmizî, Zekât 31 (667); Ebu Dâvud, Vesâyâ 12, (2877), Zekât 31, (1656).

– Esma Bintu Ebî Bekr (radıyallahu anhâ) anlatıyor: Henüz müşrik olan annem yanıma geldi. (Nasıl davranmam gerekeceği hususunda) Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’den sorarak: “Annem yanıma geldi, benimle (görüşüp konuşmak) arzu ediyor, anneme iyi davranayım mı?” dedim. “Evet” dedi, ona gereken hürmeti göster.”

Buhârî, Hibe 28, Edeb 8; Zekat 50 (1003); Ebu Dâvud, Zekât, 34, (1668);

– İbnu Ömer (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Bir adam Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’a gelerek: “Ben büyük bir günah işledim, buna tevbe imkanım var mı?” dedi. Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Annen var mı?” diye sordu. Adam: “Hayır yok” dedi.

“Peki teyzen de mi yok?” dedi. Adam: “Hayır, var” deyince Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Öyle ise ona iyilik yap!” diye emretti.”

Tirmizî, Birr 6, (1905).

Tirmizî el-Berâ’dan kaydettiği diğer bir hadiste şu ziyadeye yer verir: “Teyze anne makamındadır.”

– Ebu Üseyd Mâlik İbnu Rebî’a es-Sâidî (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Bir adam: “Ey Allah’ın Resûlü, anne ve babamın vefatlarından sonra da onlara iyilik yapma imkânı var mı, ne ile onlara iyilik yapabilirim?” diye sordu. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm): “Evet vardır” dedi ve açıkladı: “Onlara dua, onlar için Allah’tan istiğfar (günahlarının affedilmesini) taleb etmek, onlardan sonra vasiyetlerini yerine getirmek, anne ve babasının akrabalarına karşı da sıla-i rahmi ifa etmek, anne ve babanın dostlarına ikramda bulunmak.”

Ebu Dâvud, Edeb 129, (5142); İbnu Mâce, Edeb 2, (3664).

– İbnu Ömer (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm)’ı işittim, şöyle diyordu: “Kişinin yapacağı en üstün iyiliklerden biri, ölümünden sonra babasının dostlarına sıla-ı rahimde bulunmasıdır.”

Müslim, Birr,11-13 (2552); Tirmizî, Birr, 5 (1904); Ebu Dâvud, Edeb 129, (5143).

– Ömer İbnu’s-Sâib’den rivayet edildiğine göre, şu haber kendisine ulaşmıştır: “Peygamberimiz (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) bir gün otururken süt babası çıkagelir. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) hürmeten, onun için, giydiği şeylerden birini serer ve üzerine oturtur. Az sonra süt annesi gelir. Peygamberimiz (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) bunun için de elbisenin diğer tarafını serer, kadın üzerine oturur. Biraz sonra süt-oğlan kardeşi gelir. Resûlullah (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) kalkarak onu da önüne oturtur.”

Ebu Dâvud, Edeb 129, (5145).

– Zeyd İbnu Erkam (radıyallahu anh) anlatıyor: “Hz. Peygamber (aleyhissalâtu vesselâm) buyurdu ki: “Kim ebeveyninden birine bedel haccederse, bu haccla onun borcunu ödemiş olur. Bu durum semâdaki ruhuna müjdelenir. Kişi, anne ve babasına karşı isyankâr (âkk) bile olsa (bu iyiliği sebebiyle) Allah’ın nezdinde (iyi kullar meyanında) yazılır.”

Diğer bir rivayette ise: “Babası için bir hacc, kendisi için yedi hacc yazılır” denmiştir.

Bu rivayeti Rezîn tahric etti. Bu rivayet Heysemî’nin Mecmau’z-Zevâid’inde, Taberâni’nin Mu’cemu’l-Kebir’inden kaydedilmiştir (3, 282).

internet alintisi




Published: January 20, 2011

In the fall of 2009, relations between Serbia and Bosnia — never easy since the savage civil war of the 1990s — were slipping toward outright hostility. Western mediation efforts had failed. Ahmet Davutoglu, the foreign minister of Turkey, offered to step in. It was a complicated role for Turkey, not least because Bosnia is, like Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country and Serbia is an Orthodox Christian nation with which Turkey had long been at odds. But Davutoglu had shaped Turkey’s ambitious foreign policy according to a principle he called “zero problems toward neighbors.” Neither Serbia nor Bosnia actually shares a border with Turkey. Davutoglu, however, defined his neighborhood expansively, as the vast space of former Ottoman dominion. “In six months,” Davutoglu told me in one of a series of conversations this past fall, “I visited Belgrade five times, Sarajevo maybe seven times.” He helped negotiate names of acceptable diplomats and the language of a Serbian apology for the atrocities in Srebrenica. Bosnia agreed, finally, to name an ambassador to Serbia. To seal the deal, as Davutoglu tells the tale, he met late one night at the Sarajevo airport with the Bosnian leader Haris Silajdzic. The Bosnian smoked furiously. Davutoglu, a pious Muslim, doesn’t smoke — but he made an exception: “I smoked; he smoked.” Silajdzic accepted the Serbian apology. Crisis averted. Davutoglu calls this diplomatic style “smoking like a Bosnian.”

Davutoglu (pronounced dah-woot-OH-loo) has many stories like this, involving Iraq, Syria, Israel, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan — and most of them appear to be true. (A State Department official confirmed the outlines of the Balkan narrative.) He is an extraordinary figure: brilliant, indefatigable, self-aggrandizing, always the hero of his own narratives. In the recent batch of State Department cables disclosed by WikiLeaks, one scholar was quoted as anointing the foreign minister “Turkey’s Kissinger,” while in 2004 a secondhand source was quoted as calling him “exceptionally dangerous.” But his abilities, and his worldview, matter because of the country whose diplomacy he drives: an Islamic democracy, a developing nation with a booming economy, a member of NATO with one foot in Europe and the other in Asia. Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is a canny, forward-thinking populist who has drastically altered Turkish politics. Erdogan and Davutoglu share a grand vision: a renascent Turkey, expanding to fill a bygone Ottoman imperial space.

In a world that the U.S. no longer dominates as it once did, President Barack Obama has sought to forge strong relations with rising powers like India and Brazil. Turkey, however, is the one rising power that is located in the danger zone of the Middle East; it’s no coincidence that Obama chose to include Turkey in his first overseas trip and spoke glowingly of the “model partnership” between the two countries. This fits perfectly with Turkey’s ambition to be a global as well as a regional player.

And yet, despite all the mutual interests, and all of Davutoglu’s energy and innovation, something has gone very wrong over the last year. The Turks, led by Davutoglu, have embarked on diplomatic ventures with Israel and Iran, America’s foremost ally and its greatest adversary in the region, that have left officials and political leaders in Washington fuming. Obama administration officials are no longer sure whose side Turkey is on.

Davutoglu views the idea of “taking sides” as a Cold War relic. “We are not turning our face to East or West,” he told me. But it is almost impossible to have zero problems with neighbors if you live in Turkey’s neighborhood.

Istanbul is full of elegant and cosmopolitan intellectuals, few of whom had heard of Ahmet Davutoglu when he was named foreign-policy adviser to the prime minister in 2002. “Outside of Islamic circles,” says Cengiz Candar, a columnist for the daily Radikal, “he was not much known at all.” The victory of the moderate Islamist AK party in the 2002 parliamentary elections was a seismic event in Turkey, culturally as well as politically. Turkey had been an aggressively secular republic since its establishment in 1923; Turkey’s Westernized intellectuals, living in the coastal cities, especially Istanbul, looked upon the Islamists as bumpkins from the Anatolian hinterland. “These people came out of nowhere,” as Candar puts it.

Davutoglu, who is 51, hails from Konya, on the Anatolian plateau; though his English is excellent, he often drops definite articles, a sign that he came to the language relatively late. He has a slight mustache from under which a gentle and bemused smile usually pokes out. He is religiously observant; his wife, a doctor, wears a head scarf. Yet he has become surprisingly popular even among Turkey’s secular elite. “Deep in the Turkish psyche,” Candar says, “there is a feeling of pride and grandeur.” Turkey is not just another country, after all, but the heir of empires, classical as well as Ottoman, and the first secular republic in the Islamic world. Both in his intellectual work, which argues for the extraordinary status Turkey enjoys by virtue of its history and geographical position, and in his role as foreign minister, Davutoglu is seen as a champion of Turkish greatness.

He was an academic before he was a diplomat. His book “Strategic Depth,” published in Turkish in 2001, is regarded as the seminal application of international-relations theory to Turkey, though it is also a work of civilizational history and philosophy. (Such is Davutoglu’s intellectual ambition that he planned to follow up with “Philosophical Depth,” “Cultural Depth” and “Historical Depth.” He hasn’t yet gotten around to the others.) The book has gone through 41 printings in Turkish and has been translated into Greek, Albanian and now Arabic. It is 600 pages long, very dense and almost certainly more known than read. One of Davutoglu’s aides describes the book as “mesmerizing.” (Henri Barkey, a Turkey scholar at Lehigh University, pronounces the work “mumbo jumbo,” adding that Davutoglu “thinks of himself as God.”) “Strategic Depth” weaves elaborate connections between Turkey’s past and present, and among its relations in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and elsewhere. The book was read as a call for Turkey to seize its destiny.

And in many ways, Turkey has. It is one of the great success stories of the world’s emerging powers. Shrugging off the effects of the global recession, the Turkish economy last year grew by more than 8 percent, and Turkey has become the world’s 17th-largest economy. Turkey is the “soft power” giant of the Middle East, exporting pop culture and serious ideas and attracting visitors, including one and a half million Iranians a year, to gape at the Turkish miracle. Paul Salem, a Lebanon-based Middle East scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, recently suggested, “It might be Turkey’s century, because it’s the only country in the Middle East actually pointing toward the future.” You increasingly hear the view that power in the Middle East is shifting away from Arab states and toward the two non-Arab powers, Turkey and Iran. Indeed, in “Reset: Iran, Turkey and America’s Future,” Stephen Kinzer, a former New York Times reporter, describes Turkey, Iran and the U.S. as “the tantalizing ‘power triangle’ of the 21st century,” destined to replace the Cold War triangle of the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Davutoglu has climbed aboard the Turkish rocket. Turkey’s success raises his status; his achievements do the same for his country. Foreign Policy magazine ranked him No. 7 in its recent list of “100 Global Thinkers,” writing that under his leadership, “Turkey has assumed an international role not matched since a sultan sat in Istanbul’s Topkapi Palace.” Davutoglu has maintained close relations with both Erdogan and PresidentAbdullah Gul — one of the few senior figures to do so. He has filled the upper ranks of the foreign-affairs ministry with worldly, pragmatic, thoughtful diplomats who share his nationalist vision. They have done an extraordinarily deft job of balancing Turkey’s regional and global ambitions, of advancing its interests without setting off alarm bells in other capitals.

Sometimes, it’s true, Davutoglu sees his role as more important than it actually is. He told me a wonderful anecdote about bringing Iraq’s Sunni factions together in Baghdad in the fall of 2005, letting them yell at one another for weeks and finally shaming them into joining together by reminding them of the glories of medieval Baghdad and, by implication, of Iraq itself. In this version, a thrilled Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador to Iraq, rushes to Istanbul to bless the union. Actually, says a former U.S. official very familiar with the event, it wasn’t a breakthrough at all. In fact, the official says, when President Gul called Khalilzad to implore him to come, the American diplomat asked, “Why do we need to go all the way to Istanbul to talk to the same people we talk to all the time?” However, “as a favor to Gul, he said, ‘Sure.’ ”

In Davutoglu’s own endlessly unwinding narratives, he is always speaking like a Baghdadi and smoking like a Bosnian and untying all Gordian knots. Every once in a while during our conversations, Davutoglu would raise a finger and say, “This you can quote.” This meant that he was about to say something really dazzling. On the other hand, he is pretty dazzling, leaping nimbly from Mesopotamia to Alexander the Great to the Ottoman viziers to today’s consumerism, drawing unlikely parallels and surprising lessons.

Davutoglu began his career as foreign-policy adviser at a moment when Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union had become a national obsession. For Davutoglu, Erdogan and Gul, being in the E.U. offered Turkey crucial economic benefits but, more important, confirmation of its belonging in the club of the West. The Erdogan government pursued difficult economic and political reforms to advance its candidacy, then fumed as less-qualified but predominantly Christian countries like Cyprus — represented by the government of Greek Cyprus, an avowed foe of Ankara — zoomed past to full membership. Major European countries, above all France and Germany, seem determined to block Turkey’s accession to the E.U. This past June, Defense Secretary Robert Gates even suggested that “if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving Eastward,” it was the result of having been “pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the sort of organic link to the West that Turkey sought.”

This is a very common refrain, which Davutoglu is at pains to refute. On a flight to Ankara from Brussels, where he had just attended a NATO meeting, Davutoglu pushed away his half-eaten dinner and recited to me what he told his fellow foreign ministers: “If today there is an E.U., that emerged under the security umbrella of NATO. And who contributed most during those Cold War years? Turkey. Therefore when someone says, ‘Who lost Turkey?’ — there was such a question, because people said Turkey was turning to the East — this is an insult to Turkey. Why? Because it means he does not see Turkey as part of ‘we.’ It means Turkey is object, not subject. We don’t want to be on the agenda of international community as one item of crisis. We want to be in the international community to solve the crisis.”

To be part of the global “we” — this was the very definition of Erdogan’s, and Davutoglu’s, ambitions. This is why the Turks received the European rebuff as such a deep insult. And it is true, as Gates suggested, that in the aftermath, Turkey sought to raise its status in the immediate neighborhood. One of Davutoglu’s greatest diplomatic achievements was the creation of a visa-free zone linking Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, thus reconstituting part of the old Ottoman space. The four countries have agreed to move toward free trade, as well as free passage, among themselves. As part of the zero-problems policy, Turkey moved to resolve longstanding tensions with Cyprus and Armenia and, more successfully, with Greece and Syria. Turkey’s decades of suppression of Kurdish demands for autonomy put it at odds with the new government of Iraqi Kurdistan, which sheltered Kurdish resistance fighters. But the Erdo­gan government reached out to Kurdistan, America’s strongest ally in the region. Relations with the Bush administration had been rocky since 2003, when Turkey’s Parliament voted against permitting U.S. forces to enter Iraq through southeastern Turkey. But by now the U.S. was eager to use Turkey as a force for regional stability. The rapprochement with Kurdistan thus smoothed relations with Washington and made Turkey a major player in Iraqi affairs. Turkish firms gained a dominant position not only in Kurdistan but also, increasingly, throughout Iraq. And Iraqi Kurdish leaders had cracked down on the rebels. It was a diplomatic trifecta.

But Davutoglu’s vision extended far beyond securing the neighborhood for Turkish commerce. One of his pet theories is that the United States needs Turkey as a sensitive instrument in remote places. “The United States,” he says, in his declamatory way, “is the only global power in the history of humanity which emerged far away from the mainland of humanity,” which Davutoglu calls Afro-Eurasia. The United States has the advantage of security and the disadvantage of “discontinuity,” in regard to geography as well as history, because America has no deep historic relationship to the Middle East or Asia. In Davutoglu’s terms, the U.S. has no strategic depth; Turkey has much. “A global power like this, a regional power like that have an excellent partnership,” Davutoglu concludes with a flourish. Turkey has used its web of relations, especially in the Sunni world, to advance American interests in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, where Turkey recently agreed to renew its NATO mandate as the commander of the troop contingent in Kabul.

In 2007, Turkey put itself forward as a Middle East peacemaker. Ottoman Turkey was a safe harbor for Jews when much of Europe was aflame with anti-Semitism. And Republican, secular Turkey was Israel’s most dependable ally in the Middle East. Many Turkish Islamists despise Israel, but Erdogan and the AK adopted a more diplomatic line. Erdogan visited Israel in 2004, and in 2007 Turkey invited Israel’s president, Shimon Peres, to address Parliament — a rare honor. Turkish leaders then sought to broker talks between Syria and Israel over the return of the Golan Heights to Syria. At the time, the Bush administration had cut off relations with Syria, which it viewed as a proxy for Iran; but Israel was eager for an interlocutor with Damascus. The role of go-between “was not assigned to Turkey by any outside actor,” Davutoglu wrote in an essay in Foreign Policy. Turkey assigned the task to itself under a principle he called “proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy.” This is what it means to be part of “we.”

Davutoglu says he shuttled between the capitals 20 times in 2007, and in 2008 he brought both sides to Istanbul for five rounds of talks in separate hotels. He carried messages back and forth between the two. Israel needed to be convinced that Syria was prepared to stop sponsoring Hezbollah and to distance itself from Iran. Syria demanded that Israel clarify the territory from which it was prepared to withdraw. By late December, Davutoglu and his aides say, only disagreement over a word or two prevented the two sides from moving to direct talks. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel held a five-hour dinner at Erdogan’s home, in the course of which both men spoke to President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. Davutoglu had reserved a hotel room for the direct talks. An Israeli official close to the negotiations confirmed this account, saying that Davutoglu “played a very important role, a very professional role” and agreeing that face-to-face talks seemed to be in the offing. Olmert himself was quoted earlier this year as calling Erdogan “a fair mediator” and as saying, “We need negotiations with Turkish mediation.”

But it was all what might have been, for only a few days after the meeting, Israel launched its Cast Lead invasion of Gaza, inflaming the Arab world and humiliating and infuriating Erdogan. The talks collapsed. The Israeli official says, “We told the Turks that we will have to respond” to the hail of missiles coming from Gaza; Israel had not deceived the Turks, because Israel’s cabinet authorized the invasion days after the Olmert-Erdogan dinner. That’s not how Turkey saw the sequence of events. It was, Davutoglu says solemnly, “an insult to Turkey.” Certainly the Turkish public felt it as one, and Erdogan, a shrewd judge of public opinion, understood that very well. Turkey is a democracy, after all; and the public reaction to Gaza, on top of the rebuff from the European Union — and perhaps also the inherent logic of the “zero problems” policy — sent the country in a new direction.

Turkey’s interests in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, and for that matter in Israel, coincided with those of the United States and the West. But its run of luck ended in Iran. In September 2009, the Iranians, under pressure from the West to show that they were not seeking to build a nuclear weapon, offered to send 1,200 kilograms of uranium abroad in exchange for an equal amount to be enriched sufficiently for civilian use. Iran didn’t trust any Western country to hold its uranium; but it might trust Turkey. Davutoglu sprang into action, flying back and forth to Tehran to work out the details — over which the Iranians, typically, bickered and stalled.

The cables recently disclosed by WikiLeaks vividly illustrate the tensions this produced with Washington. In a meeting with the assistant secretary of state Philip Gordon in Ankara in November 2009, Davutoglu advanced his theory of Turkish exceptionalism: “Only Turkey,” he said, “can speak bluntly and critically to the Iranians.” Davutoglu was confident that Iran was ready to strike a deal — with Turkey’s help. An obviously skeptical Gordon “pressed” him on his “assessment of the consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon.” In what the cable’s author described as “a spirited reply,” Davutoglu insisted that Turkey was well aware of the risk. Gordon “pushed back that Ankara should give a stern public message” to Iran; Davutoglu replied that they were doing so in private and “emphasized that Turkey’s foreign policy is giving ‘a sense of justice’ and ‘a sense of vision’ to the region.”

Behind this tense exchange with Gordon was the fear that Turkey was cutting Iran too much slack. Davutoglu is quite open about the fact that Turkey has interests in Iran that the United States and Europe do not have. “Our economy is growing,” Davutoglu told me, “and Iran is the only land corridor for us to reach Asia. Iran is the second source of energy for Turkey.” Sanctions on Iran would hurt Turkey. But Davutoglu also insists that Turkey’s assessment of Iran’s intentions is not affected by its interests. It’s easy to see why Gordon was skeptical. Prime Minister Erdogan has dismissed fears that Iran wants to build a bomb as “gossip.” And when I asked one of Davutoglu’s senior aides about the matter, he said: “For the time being, Iran does not have a nuclear-weapons program. We don’t know whether they will go there.”

At President Obama’s nuclear summit meeting last April, Erdogan and the president of Brazil, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, proposed to Obama that they work jointly to persuade Iran to surrender the uranium — a striking example of the rising confidence of the emerging powers. Administration officials made it very clear that they feared Iran would try to hoodwink Turkey and Brazil. Davutoglu nonetheless resumed his manic routine — State Department officials call him the Energizer Bunny — flying back and forth to Tehran well into May, pushing the Iranians to make concessions. In his seventh and final session, he worked at it for 18 hours before reaching a deal. Davutoglu was so excited that he called Turkish reporters from the plane to invite them to a briefing upon his arrival. But by the time the journalists returned to their offices to write the story, they got word that the United States had rejected the deal.

The Turks had announced their diplomatic coup at precisely the moment the Obama administration finally induced Russia and China to vote for tough sanctions on Iran in the Security Council. Davutoglu says he never took a step without informing the Americans, but American officials said that the terms of the deal took them by surprise. The Turks mostly hid their hurt feelings. But in early June, the rift with the U.S. played out in public when Turkey and Brazil voted against the sanctions resolution. Turkish officials say the last thing they wanted was to defy the U.S. on a matter of American national security, but President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran said he would consider the “swap deal” terminated unless Turkey and Brazil voted against the resolution. They were, they insist, voting for continued diplomacy, not for Iran or against the United States and the West.

Maybe Turkey was simply protecting its regional interests, which now include not only preserving good relations with Iran but also enhancing its credibility in the Middle East — even at the expense of its standing in the West. Maybe, for all Davutoglu’s protestations, Ankara doesn’t view the world the way Washington does or London does. In a meeting earlier this year at the Council on Foreign Relations, Henri Barkey observed that when you talk to Erdogan or Davutoglu about Iran, “the response is almost as if you pressed a button: the problem is not Iran; the problem is Israel; Israel has weapons; Iran doesn’t have weapons.” Or maybe the problem is that you can’t have zero problems with everybody.

Iran, unfortunately, was only the half of it. The other half was Israel. Three weeks after the Gaza war, Erdogan angrily stalked out of a public session with Shimon Peres at Davos, Switzerland. Israel responded with equal pettiness, staging a humiliation of Turkey’s ambassador to Israel. Erdogan, long a champion of Hamas, became more vocal in his support for a group Israel viewed as a threat to its very existence. In the spring of 2010, a Turkish charitable organization, I.H.H., chartered the flotilla designed to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Davutoglu says that he tried to persuade the group not to sail and then asked the organizer of the flotilla to turn aside if Israel stopped the ships, as it was certain to do, and to offload the cargo at a port outside Gaza if necessary. In late May, the day before the flotilla set sail, a senior Turkish official called the Israelis to alert them to the ships’ embarking and to say, “Please don’t engage in violence.”

Of course, it didn’t work out that way. The flotilla refused Israel’s demands to alter course, and a helicopter-borne commando assault on the Mavi Marmara, the lead ship, turned deadly, with eight Turkish citizens and one American killed. The Gaza war had embittered Turkish public opinion; now angry crowds gathered across the country, denouncing Israel and chanting Islamic slogans. Erdogan railed against Israel and stoutly defended Hamas, denying that it was a terrorist organization. He described Israel, with which he had been earnestly negotiating a year earlier, as “a festering boil in the Middle East that spreads hate and enmity.” Turkey demanded an apology. Israel, which viewed the flotilla as a provocation abetted, and perhaps orchestrated, by Ankara, refused. Davutoglu was almost as inflammatory as his prime minister. In a statement to the Security Council the day after the assault, he said, “This is a black day in the history of humanity, where the distance between terrorists and states has been blurred.”

Turkey seemed to have made a choice among its conflicting ambitions. Steven Cook, a Middle East scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently wrote, “Erdogan and his party believe they benefit domestically from the position Turkey has staked out in the Middle East,” and thus “the demands of domestic Turkish politics now trump the need to maintain good relations with the United States.” Turkey may be turning in a new direction, in other words, not so much because it has been rejected by the West as because it is being so ardently embraced by the East.

The net effect of Turkey’s vehement reaction to the flotilla, which by an unfortunate quirk of timing came two weeks after the nuclear deal with Iran and a week before the sanctions vote, was to wreck whatever remained of its relations with Israel and to seriously harm its standing in the U.S. “The hyperbolic and provocative rhetoric” in the aftermath of the Mavi Marmara incident, says a senior administration official, “has interfered with what has been a historic and hugely important, positive Turkish-Israeli relationship.” And it has done real damage in the court of public opinion, where Turkey looks like the enemy of the United States’ best friend in the Middle East as well as the friend of its worst enemy. After the Mavi Marmara incident, Thomas L. Friedman asserted in The Times, perhaps hyperbolically, that Turkey had joined “the Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against Israel.”

Tempers have cooled in recent months. U.S. officials have tried to encourage a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Last June, Israel’s trade minister, Benyamin Ben-Eliezer, invited Davutoglu to speak with him quietly in Brussels. But the contents of the conversation were leaked almost immediately in Israel, presumably by hardliners opposed to any easing of tensions. Relations with Washington remain fraught. “There’s so much we want to do together,” as the official cited above puts it, “but it’s harder for us to do that if the American and Congressional perspective on Turkey is a negative one” — which right now, he added, it is.

A few months before he became Turkey’s foreign minister, Davutoglu visited Washington to meet with the incoming Obama team. He was dazzled. George W. Bush, he thought, had been America’s Caesar; Obama would be its Marcus Aurelius, its philosopher-king. “There will be a golden age in Turkish-American relations,” he predicted. It hasn’t worked out that way, and Davutoglu can barely process a setback so at odds with his grand intellectual and policy construct. He says that he was “shocked” when the U.S. opposed a United Nations Human Rights Council resolution calling for an investigation of “the outrageous attack by the Israeli forces against the humanitarian flotilla.” (The administration said such a commission seemed to be rushing to judgment, and it endorsed instead a panel convened by the U.N. secretary-general.) But the professionals Davutoglu has surrounded himself with are not deluding themselves about their plight. “We’re getting a lot of flak from the Hill,” says Selim Yenel, the official in the foreign ministry responsible for relations with Washington. “We used to get hit by the Greek lobby and the Armenian lobby, but we were protected by the Jewish lobby. Now the Jewish lobby is coming after us as well.”

The truth is that for all his profound knowledge of the history of civilizations, Davutoglu misread the depth of feeling in the U.S. about both Israel and Iran, or perhaps overestimated Turkey’s importance. This is the danger of postimperial grandiosity. “They talk as if they expect a merger between Turkey and the E.U.,” says Hugh Pope, head of the Turkish office of the International Crisis Group. “They think they’re more important than Israel.”

Perhaps the setback is just a blip, a brief reversal in the upward path of one of the world’s rising powers. On the flight home from Brussels, where he conferred privately with Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and met with his European counterparts, Davutoglu was in an ebullient mood. He feels the wind of history filling his sails. Turkey, the crossroads of civilizations, the land where East and West, North and South, converge, is pointing the way to the world’s future. “Turkey is the litmus test of globalization,” he told me. “Success for Turkey will mean the success of globalization.” The world, as Davutoglu likes to say, expects great things from Turkey.




Published: March 27, 2010
In 1981, Israel destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak, declaring it could not live with the chance the country would get a nuclear weapons capability. In 2007, it wiped out a North Korean-built reactor in Syria. And the next year, the Israelis secretly asked the Bush administration for the equipment and overflight rights they might need some day to strike Iran’s much better-hidden, better-defended nuclear sites.

They were turned down, but the request added urgency to the question: Would Israel take the risk of a strike? And if so, what would follow?

Now that parlor game question has turned into more formal war games simulations. The government’s own simulations are classified, but the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution created its own in December. The results were provocative enough that a summary of them has circulated among top American government and military officials and in many foreign capitals.

A caution: Simulations compress time and often oversimplify events. Often they underestimate the risk of error — for example, that by using faulty intelligence leaders can misinterpret a random act as part of a pattern of aggression. In this case, the actions of the American and Israeli teams seemed fairly plausible; the players knew the bureaucracy and politics of both countries well. Predicting Iran’s moves was another matter, since little is known about its decision-making process. —DAVID E. SANGER


Without telling the U.S. in advance, Israel strikes at six of Iran’s most critical nuclear facilities, using a refueling base hastily set up in the Saudi Arabian desert without Saudi knowledge. (It is unclear to the Iranians if the Saudis were active participants or not.)

Already-tense relations between the White House and Israel worsen rapidly, but the lack of advance notice allows Washington to say truthfully that it had not condoned the attack.


In a series of angry exchanges, the U.S. demands that Israel cease its attacks, though some in Washington view the moment as an opportunity to further weaken the Iranian government, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Telling Israel it has made a mess, Washington essentially instructs the country to sit in a corner while the United States tries to clean things up.


Even while calling for restraint on all sides, the U.S. deploys more Patriot antimissile batteries and Aegis cruisers around the region, as a warning to Iran not to retaliate. Even so, some White House advisers warn against being sucked into the conflict, believing that Israel’s real strategy is to lure America into finishing the job with additional attacks on the damaged Iranian facilities.


Despite warnings, Iran fires missiles at Israel, including its nuclear weapons complex at Dimona, but damage and casualties are minimal. Meanwhile, two of Iran’s proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, launch attacks in Israel and fire rockets into the country.

Believing it already has achieved its main goal of setting back the nuclear program by years, Israel barely responds.


Iran, while wounded, sees long-term opportunities to unify its people – and to roll over its opposition parties – on nationalistic grounds. Its strategy is to mount low-level attacks on Israel while portraying the United States as a paper tiger – unable to control its ally and unwilling to respond to Iran.

Convinced that the Saudis had colluded with the Israelis, and emboldened by the measured initial American position, Iran fires missiles at the Saudi oil export processing center at Abqaiq, and tries to incite Shiite Muslims in eastern Saudi Arabia to attack the Saudi regime.

Iran also conducts terror attacks against European targets, in hopes that governments there will turn on Israel and the United States.


After a meeting of its divided leadership, Iran decides against directly attacking any American targets – to avoid an all-out American response.


Though Iran’s retaliation against Israel causes only modest damage, critics in the Israeli media say the country’s leaders, by failing to respond to every attack, have weakened the credibility of the nation’s deterrence. Hezbollah fires up to 100 rockets a day into northern Israel, with some aimed at Haifa and Tel Aviv.

The Israeli economy comes to a virtual halt, and Israeli officials, urging American intervention, complain that one-third of the country’s population is living in shelters. Hundreds of thousands flee Haifa and Tel Aviv.


Israel finally wins American acquiescence to retaliate against Hezbollah. It orders a 48-hour campaign by air and special forces against Lebanon and begins to prepare a much larger air and ground operation.


Knowing that its ultimate weapon is its ability to send oil prices sky high, Iran decides to attack Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, an oil industry center, with conventional missiles and begins mining the Strait of Hormuz.

A Panamanian-registered, Americanowned tanker and an American minesweeper are severely damaged. The price of oil spikes, though temporarily.


Unable to sit on the sidelines while oil supplies and American forces are threatened, Washington begins a massive military reinforcement of the Gulf region.


The game ends eight days after the initial Israeli strike. But it is clear the United States was leaning toward destroying all Iranian air, ground and sea targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and that Iran’s forces were about to suffer a significant defeat. Debate breaks out over how much of Iran’s nuclear program was truly crippled, and whether the country had secret backup facilities that could be running in just a year or two.


1. By attacking without Washington’s advance knowledge, Israel had the benefits of surprise and momentum – not only over the Iranians, but over its American allies – and for the first day or two, ran circles around White House crisis managers.

2. The battle quickly sucked in the whole region – and Washington. Arab leaders who might have quietly applauded an attack against Iran had to worry about the reaction in their streets. The war shifted to defending Saudi oil facilities, and Iran’s use of proxies meant that other regional players quickly became involved.

3. You can bomb facilities, but you can’t bomb knowledge. Iran had not only scattered its facilities, but had also scattered its scientific and engineering leadership, in hopes of rebuilding after an attack.

4. No one won, and the United States and Israel measured success differently. In Washington, officials believed setting the Iranian program back only a few years was not worth the huge cost. In Israel, even a few years delay seemed worth the cost, and the Israelis argued that it could further undercut a fragile regime and perhaps speed its demise. Most of the Americans thought that was a pipe dream. —D.E.S.

Illustrations by Alicia Cheng and Sarah Gephart, Mgmt. Design.



Mahmut Özkan – Sızıntı

İnsanoğlunun en kompleks ve en az bilinen organı ve bütün duyularımızın merkezi olan, beynimiz üzerinde yapılan araştırmalar her geçen gün hızlı bir şekilde artmaktadır. Organik maddelerin, tesadüflere imkan vermeyecek bir komplekslik içinde müthiş bir dizayna bağlı olarak, ilim ve kudreti gösterdiği bu organımızın yaratılışındaki sırların büyüklüğü hakkında, bilim adamları arasında ittifak vardır. Beynin hangi bölgesinin hangi faaliyetlerle alakalı olduğunu belirlemek için yapılan araştırma ve gözlemlerden anlaşıldığı kadarıyla, beynimizin belirli bölgelerinin hususi vazifelere göre hazırlanmış olduğu fark edilse bile, birçok merkez çok kompleks ve özel yollarla birbiri ile irtibatlandırılmıştır. Dolayısıyla bir hayal, bir koku veya görüntü ile beynin ilgili merkezi yanında birçok dolaylı merke-zinde bilemediğimiz tesirler açığa çıkmaktadır. Beynimizi teşkil eden hücreler (neuron) arasındaki haberleşme ve diyaloglar, bu hücrelerde üretilen elektrik akımları vasıtasıyla yürütülmektedir.

Bazen yollarda, düşmüş, çırpınan ve kafasını yere vuran veya ağzı köpürürek yarı baygın halde yatan insanlar görürüz. Bu kişilerin başına toplananlar da hastanın ellerini oğuşturur veya soğan koklatırlar, kendini yaralamaması için kafasını tutarlar. Üzülerek seyrettiğimiz bu manzara, çoğumuzun bildiği gibi sara veya tıp tabiriyle epilepsi hastalığıdır. Beynin elektrik faaliyetlerini ayarlayıcı bir sistem üzerinde yapılan çalışmalarla inşa-allah, bundan sonra sara krizlerini önleme imkanı sağlanacak gibi görünüyor. Hiçbir ilacın önüne geçemediği bu korkunç hastalıktan muzdarip insanlar için büyük bir umut doğdu.

Medyanın çok güncelleştirdiği Parkinson veya Alz-heimer hastalıklarının ötesinde, sara hastalığı, dünyada en yaygın nörolojik (sinir sistemine ait) rahatsızlıktır. Hatta, hastahanelerin nöroloji servislerinde başlıca kabul sebebi niteliği taşımaktadır.

Bu hastalıktan dünyada 50 milyon kişinin muzdarip olduğu tahmin edilmektedir. Gelişmiş ülkelerde, toplam nüfusun % 0,5-1’ine zarar verdiği sanılıyor. Sara hastalığı ile savaşan Amerikalı bir kurum, her sene 125.000 yeni sara vakası teşhis etmektedir. Fransa için bu rakam 400.000-500.000 arasında değişmektedir. Sara hastalığına karşı ilaç yapımı, bu hastalığa tesirli ilaçların sayısının bir elin parmakları kadar olması sebebiyle zaten çok sınırlıdır. Ayrıca mevcut bazı ilaçların kısmi tesirlerinin de her zaman ilmi olarak açıklanamadığını da hatırlatmak gerekir!

Sessiz Kalma Tercihi

Bugünlerde Fransa’da, tedaviye cevap vermeyen hastaların sara nöbetlerini iyileştirme kapasitesi ispatlanmış bir cihaz geliştirilmiş bulunmaktadır. Söz konusu cihaz, sara nöbetlerinin temelinde bulunan ve beynin bazı bölümlerinin yaydığı akımın boşalmalarını kontrol eden elektrik uyaranlarını, uygun aralıklı bir tempo ile beyne gönderir.

Kalp üzerinde bulunan ve kalbin otomatik atımlarını uyaran merkez gibi, beynin de çalışma hızını ayarlayan “pacemaker” (otomatik düzenleme merkezi), bu cihazla kontrol altında tutulmaktadır. Bu yeni icatla yapılan tedavi, sara hastalığının ilaç yoluyla tedavilerinden daha fazla pahalı değildir.

Sara hastalığı hakkında sürdürülen sessiz kalma durumunun sebebi, günümüzde sahalarında çok ender bulunan uzmanlaşmış si-nirbilimcilerin ve sara hastalığı uzmanlarının, bu hastalıkla ilgili az malumata sahip olmalarıdır. Sözü edilen hastalığın yirmi kadar farklı sebebi vardır ve değişik kriz nöbetleriyle kendisini göstermektedir. Olayların % 70’inde (beynin herhangi bir bölgesindeki) kaynak bilinse bile, bu nöbetlerin niçin meydana geldiği açıklanamamaktadır.

Herkes bu hastalık hakkında konuşmak yahut “açıklığa kavuşturmak” yerine, meselenin üzerine usulca perde çekmeyi tercih etmektedir. Çoğu zaman da yanlış olarak, bu hastalık bir akıl hastalığı gibi kabul edilmektedir. Bazen de, hastanın vicdanını rahatlatmak maksadıyla, bazı “dahi” kişilerin de (Sezar, Flaubert, Dostoyevski gibi) bu rahatsızlığa yakalandıkları hatırlatılır ve sonra da başka şeylerden bahsedilir. Halbuki, bu hastalık insanların hayat tarzını bozmakta ve korkutmaktadır. Birçok hasta için ise, kendine güven kaybına yol açmaktadır.

Peki, sara hastalığı hakkında ilmi olarak ne biliyoruz?

Bu, ömür boyu süren bir hastalıktır; sebebini bilmediğimiz bir şekilde kimi sara hastalan yılda sadece üç nöbet geçirirken kimi hastalar da günde yüz nöbet geçirmektedir! Bu nöbetlerin büyük çoğunluğu iyi huylu olup, beynin bir bölgesinin (lokalize sara hastalığı) hasarından veya çalışma bozukluğundan ileri gelmektedir (Resim 1). Epileptojen (sara üreten) denilen bu bölgelerin ameliyatı çok nadir yapılabilmektedir; çünkü ya erişilemeyecek durumdadırlar veya felç gibi, çok daha önemli sakıncalara yol açmadan, cerrahın bu bölgelere dokunamamasındandır. Beyin normal çalışırken, bu bölgelerde ortaya çıkan kısa süreli elektrik düzensizlikleri veya “kısa devreler” türünden akım boşalmaları, sara nöbetlerini başlatmakta ve bunları önceden tahmin etmek de henüz imkansız görülmektedir. Vücut ile beyin arasındaki uyumun geçici bir süre için bozulmasından kaynaklanan kesintisiz nöbetleri hastalar genellikle nöbetin gelişinden hemen önce bir ikaz işareti ile haberdar olurlar. Bu da genel bir özellik olarak, “acayip bir tat”, “kötü bir his” ve bir karıncalanma hissi ile kendisini gösteren “esinti” hissidir.

Güçlükle Tanımlanabilen Beyin Yaraları

1999senesinde, sara hastalığı hakkında ilmi olarak söylenebileceklerin hepsi işte bu kadar. Aslında ne kadar da az! Deneylere dayanarak, hastalığın belirtileri ve çeşitli tezahürlerinin, nöbetlerin gözlemlenmesi sayesinde, sara hastalığı uzmanları dört sınıf ve üç sebebe bağlı 20’den fazla sara nöbeti tipi bulunduğunu müşahede etmişlerdir. Bu durumda bir tek sara hastalığı değil, birçok sara hastalığının mevcut olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.

Bu nöbetlerin ancak % 30’u kaynağı bilinen nöbetler olup, beynin yaralanmalarına bağlıdır. En sık karşılaşılan sebepler ise kafatası yaralanmaları, beyin urları, beyin kanamaları, kurşun zehirlenmesi veya alkolizm; menenjit, beyin iltihabı (virüsten kaynaklanan), difteri ve daha nadir görülen, kabakulak, kızamık ve diğer çocuk hastalıklarıdır.

Sara nöbetleri kısmi ve genel nöbet olarak iki bölüme ayrılabilir. Kısmi nöbetler, beynin özel bir bölümünden kaynaklanmakta ve bir kolun ya da bir bacağın adale sarsıntısı, dudakların gelişigüzel birbirine çarpması gibi fiziki davranışlarla ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu nöbetler birkaç dakikadan başlayıp uzun süre devam edebilirler. Sertlik durumlarına göre, hastanın tepkisi vücudun sadece bir kısmında (basit kısmi nöbet) ya da aynı anda birçok kısmında görülebilir ve şuur kaybına (tam kısmi nöbet) yol açabilir. Genel nöbetler, beynin iki yanına yayılmış olanları ihtiva eder ve çoğu zaman şuur kaybına yol açan feci çırpınmalara sebep olur. Sara hastalarının % 39’u genel nöbetlerden muzdarip olurlar.

Kurtulmak İçin Dört Molekül Nöbetlerin birçok kategoride sınıflandırılması yapılabilir:

– Güç kaybından kaynaklanan nöbetler: Bunlar genellikle bacaklardaki adale gücünün ani, geçici kaybı sonucu insanın düşmesi ile kendilerini gösterir.

– Dalgınlık nöbetleri: Bunlar fark edilmesi zor olan ve çok kısa süren, birkaç saniyelik şuur kaybına yol açan nöbetlerdir. Çocukluk döneminde daha fazla görülebilirse de yetişkinlerde de ortaya çıkabilir.

– Kas çarpıntısı nöbetleri: Bu nöbetlerden muzdarip kişiler, yaklaşık bir dakika süren kas sarsılmaları hissederler.

– Kas kasılması-bölünme nöbetleri: Bunlar, bütün vücudun sertleşmesi sonrası kas sarsılmaları ve kasılmalarının ortaya çıkmasıyla kendisini gösteren nöbetlerdir. Bu nöbetlerin kurbanları şuurlarını kaybedebilir ve idrarlarını kontrol edemeyebilirler.

Bu sıralama, sara hastalığının hastanın hayatına yasaklayıcı sınırlar getiren ve sakat bırakabilen bir rahatsızlık olduğunu gösterir. Nöbet tehlikesine karşı kullanılan ilaçların yan tesirleri, hastaların fiziki, ruhi ve içtimai huzuru üzerinde ağır bir yük oluşturur. Nöbetlerini kontrol altına alamayan hastalar, okula gitmekte, sürücü ehliyeti almakta ve iş sahibi olmakta zorluk çekerler. Başkalarına karşı bir bağımlılık duygusu geliştirirler ve kendilerine olan itimatlarını sık sık kaybederler.

Bu hastaların aileleri belirsizlik içinde yaşarlar; zira, bu hastalarda açıklanamayan ani ölüm, kaza sonucu ölüm ve intiharla ölüm riski, normal insanlardaki ortalamanın üstünde bir durum arz eder. Bu kadar çok çeşitli nöbetleri olan bu hastalığa karşı mücadele etmek için tamamen de çaresiz değiliz. Bazı tip vakalara çok iyi gelen ilaçlar mevcuttur. Bu ilaçların neyin üzerinde ve nasıl tesirli olduğunu, her zaman iyi bilemiyoruz. Temelde, bir araya getirdikleri dört molekül ile sınırlanabilirler. Bunlar, carbamazepin, valpro-at, phenytoin, pheno-barbitol molekülleridir. Fakat, bu ilaçlar bazı sara türlerine karşı tesirli değildir. Ayrıca, bir ömür boyu alınacak olan bu ilaç listesi, nöbetlerin sebeplerini değil, belirtilerini giderir.

Son olarak, halihazırdaki tıbbi uygulama, arzu edilmeyen sonuçları en aza indirmek ve tedavinin gittikçe artan bir şekilde tesirini azaltan, alışkanlık tehlikesini sınırlamaktan ibarettir. Söz konusu arzu edilmeyen sonuçlar; beynin yavaşlaması, uyuşukluk hatta uyuklama durumu, dikkatini toplama zorlukları gibi hususlardır.

Hiçbir Tehlike Yok

Böyle kara bir tablo karşısında, yüz yıldan beri ilk defa, sara hastalığının tedavisinde yeni bir yaklaşımın haberi ümit ışığı doğurdu. Amerikan Cyberonics şirketinin sunduğu bu nevro-sibernetik protez (NCP) sisteminin, tedaviye cevap vermeyen sara türlerinde bile tesirli olduğu ispatlanmıştır. Hiç bir derdi devasız bırakmayan kudreti sonsuz Rabbimiz bu sefer de ilim adamlarına bir cihazı icat imkanı vermiştir.

Klinik devre öncesi on yıldan fazla bir süredir yapılan araştırma ve incelemeler sonucu ortaya koyulan bu cihaz, ilk önce Avrupa Birliği, sonra da ünlü ve sert kuralları bulunan Amerikan Gıda ve İlaç Kurulu tarafından tasdiklenmiştir.

NCP sisteminin ilk kuruluşu 1988 yılında oldu. O zamandan beri 24 değişik ülkeden 1.000’den fazla sara hastası bu sisteme girdi. Bu sistemi kullanan hastaların yarısında sara nöbetlerinde % 20’lik ani bir düşüş görülürken, on sekiz aylık bir süre sonrasında % 50’den fazla bir nöbet azalması tespit edilmiştir.

Ayrıca, idrak ile ilgili davranışlara veya hissiyata dair arzu edilmeyen tesirleri bulunmamakta ve sara hastalığına karşı kullanılan ilaçların herhangi bir zehirleme tehlikesinden de uzaktır. Bu sistemin zamanla azalmayan tesir özelliği de mevcuttur.

Basit ve Tehlikesiz Yerleştirme

Vagus sinirinin uyarılmasına dayanan tedavi, her beş dakikada bir elektrik akımı yayımından oluşmaktadır. Bu yayım 1,25-2,5 miliamper yoğunluğunda, 30 hertz frekansında ve 50 nanoseconde (1 nanoseconde = 10^9 saniye) süresindedir. Bu cihazın vücuda yerleştirilmesi son derece kolaydır. 55 gram ağırlığında ve küçük bir cep saati ebadında bir jeneratörden ibaret olan aleti, vücuda yerleştirebilmek için iki neşter darbesi yeterlidir. Biri kürek kemiği hizasında jeneratörü ve pilini yerleştirmek üzere, diğeri vagus siniri üzerine e/ektrot/an yerleştirmek için boynun sol tarafına küçük bir kesik atılır (Resim 2). Cerrahın gerçekleştireceği bir “geçit açma” işlemi elektrotları pile bağlama imkanı verir.

Peki niçin vagus siniri? Çünkü, beyin ile iç organlar arasındaki faaliyetleri, en kuvvetli bir şekilde denetlemekle vazifelendirilmiş olan, bu sinirdir. Bu, hem hareket ettirici hem de duyu alıcı olarak iş gören bir karma sinirdir. Söz konusu sinir esas olarak % 85 oranında yaygın -yani vücudun alt kısmından üst kısmına bilgileri nakleden tellerden müteşekkildir. Bu teller, merkezi sinir sisteminin ortasında etrafa geniş bir şekilde dağıtılmış durumdadır. Akciğerlere, kalbe, ana atar damara, bağırsağa, vs… bağlıdır. Beyin sapındaki yapılara bilgileri naklederler. Bu yapılar, sara nöbeti boşalmalarını meydana getirmekteki kapasiteleri ile tanınmaktadır.

Vagus sinirinin yaygın telleri sayesinde sara nöbetlerini oluşturan bölgeler üzerinde etki göstererek beyin faaliyetinin değiştirilmesinin başarılması, önleyici bir tedavi niteliği arzetmektedir. Sara nöbetlerinin temelindeki ani elektrik boşalmalarını gereksiz kılmak suretiyle beynin elektrik faaliyeti değiştirilebilmektedir.

Bu yeni tedavinin maliyeti, 50 bin franklık peşin bir maliyetin yanı sıra, her beş yılda bir pilin değiştirilmesi mecburiyetini getiriyor. Bu ise, geleneksel ilaçlarla tedavinin masrafına aşağı yukarı denk düşmektedir. Fakat bu sistemin, diğer ilaçlar gibi hastaya zarar verici yan tesirleri yoktur.

Beyin gibi en hayati organımızla ilgili bu tip hastalıklar eskiden insanı aciz bırakan bir karakterde iken, zamanla geliştirilen bu tedavi metotları sayesinde acılı aileler ve kırık gönüller bu hastalıkla olan imtihanlarını inşaallah bundan sonra daha kolay geçirecekler gibi görünüyor. Allah’ın yarattığı en eşsiz sanat eserlerinden biri olan insan beyninin sırlarına, yine onun verdiği ilimle daha derinliğine nüfuz edebilirsek, hem daha başka hastalıkların çaresini bulabilir, hem de maddi yapısı ile %90’ı su olan pelte şeklindeki beynimizin nasıl eşsiz bir sanat eseri olduğunu, yine beynimizle, daha iyi idrak edebiliriz.”



Profesör Doktor Ahmet Maranki, Epilepsi ( Sara Hastalığı) için tamamen doğal, bitkisel çözüm önerileri verdi

Epilepsi Sara Hastalığı , beyin yollarını tıkayan ani ve anormal deşarj durumlarıdır. Sara

* Mavi çarkıfelek otunu kaynatın ve kaliteli, katkısız bal kullanarak tatlandırıp için.
* Nergis çiçeği kokusu sara hastalığına iyi gelir.
* Yulaf kaynatarak içmek sara nöbetlerine faydalıdır. İçerisine kediotu da ilave edebilirsiniz.
* Kantaron çiçeği ile kaliteli, katkısız bal karıştırılarak macun haline getirilir ve tüketilir. Bu karışım sara köpüğüne iyi gelmektedir.
* Çınar kabuğunu kaynatın ve kaliteli, katkısız bal kullanarak tatlandırıp için.



Nun. Wal qalami wama yasturun. (The Pen: 1)

Allah fogives the one who writes Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim in a fine manner while glorifying Him. (Hadith Sharif)

Take record of knowledge with books. (Fayd al Qadir 530/4) and in another narration: Take record of knowledge by writing. (Ramuz al Ahadith 4165)

Take care of writing well. For it is one of the keys of sustenance. (Ruh al Bayan, Volume 7, 314)





İlim bir avdır, yazmak onun bağıdır.

(Ruh al Bayan 473/10)

Kayıt olmayan hikmet kayıp olur. (Fazilet Takvimi 1998)

Yazı ilmin yarısıdır. Yazısız alim yarım alimdir.


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